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REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART II:
NON-HOMICIDE CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
By Judith J. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the second in a series of articles advocating for change to the
Mississippi criminal laws. The first article explained why change is
needed.1 Briefly, our criminal laws have been justifiably criticized.2 Some
of the shortcomings of the Mississippi law include sentencing disparity,3
enabling defendants who have engaged in the same criminal conduct to
have widely disparate sentences. In addition, the Mississippi criminal laws
often have vague definitions of the conduct prohibited,4 as well as
confusing or absent definitions of states of mind required to commit the
crime. The hallmark of a fair criminal justice system is that whatever is
forbidden is clearly defined in the criminal code. Finally, the criminal
statutes are disorganized and do not relate to each other.5
The Mississippi Judicial Advisory Committee, established in 1993
by the legislature to improve the administration of justice,6 appointed the
Criminal Code Consulting Group (hereinafter referred to as “the
Committee”) to suggest revisions to the penal code. The Committee has
been meeting since 1996 and is finally reaching the end of its charge and
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. I want to thank all my
research assistants who have provided valuable support over the years to me and to the
Committee, especially my current research assistants Benjiman Blakely and Taylor
Pilger.
1. Judith J. Johnson, Why Mississippi Should Reform Its Penal Code, 37 MISS.
C. L.REV. 107 (2019).
2. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammed, The Five
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3
(2000) ranked the Mississippi Criminal Code as being the fifty-second worst criminal
code in the U.S. The study included the federal code and the D.C. code in their
assessments. Id.
3. Many criminal statutes in Mississippi provide a range of decades as a
possible sentence, such as one year to thirty years. See Johnson, supra note 2, discussion
accompanying notes 60-63.
4. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 67-72.
5. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 72-76.
6. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-21-1 (1993 Cumulative Supplement). The Judicial
Advisory Study Committee was eliminated in 2018. H.B. 949 (2018). The Criminal
Code Consulting Group (the Committee) is now operating under the auspices of the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
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will present its proposals to the legislature in the foreseeable future. This
Committee, which I have chaired for more than twenty years, is
recommending a comprehensive change to the laws to alleviate some of the
problems with the current code. The Committee proposals will improve the
administration of the criminal justice system by providing clear definitions
of the conduct prohibited and the states of mind required for the crimes,
which will also be clearly defined.7
This second in a series of articles continues to present the case for
penal code reform. The purpose of these articles is to explain the
Committee’s reasoning and the proposed changes to the law. This series of
articles is intended to replace comments, which the Committee did not
write, although there are extensive comments to the Model Code Penal, on
which these proposals are based.
The first article introduced and explained the Committee’s process.8
In addition, the first article explained two important substantive areas of
change: states of mind and homicide.9 This article addresses the most
serious crimes against the person, other than homicide, and explains the
Committee’s recommendations regarding assault and battery and related
crimes, kidnapping and related crimes, and sex crimes.10 Future articles
will explain the other groups of crimes and other issues that the Committee
has addressed.
Section II of this article briefly reviews the methodology of the
Committee’s work; Section III explains the proposed changes to assault and
battery and related offenses; Section IV explains the proposed changes to
kidnapping and related offenses; Section V explains the proposed changes
to sex crimes; and Section VI concludes.
II. COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE
As described more fully in the first article,11 the Committee has been
meeting since 1996 and consists of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
legislative drafters, and law professors.12 The Committee has reviewed the
7. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V.1.
8. Id. at II.
9. Id. at V.1.
10. Robbery, which is also a serious crime against the person, will be discussed
in the next article, along with arson and burglary.
11. See Johnson, supra note 2, at II.
12. Current committee members: Professor Judith J. Johnson, chair, Professor
Matthew Steffey, reporter, Judge Donna Barnes, Patrick Beasley, Judge John Emfinger,
Greta Harris, Caryn Quilter, Professor Ronald J. Ryclak, Kathy Sones, Alison Steiner, Ed
Snyder, and Gwynetta Tatum.
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most important parts of Title 97 of Mississippi Code of 1972, which
contains the principal criminal statutes, working to develop a penal code
that is more coherent and comprehensive than current law.13
As explained in more detail in the first article,14 at each monthly
meeting, we compare the Mississippi law to the relevant provisions of the
Model Penal Code (hereinafter “Model Code”), as well as to the laws of
other states.15 We then propose changes to the Mississippi law to reflect
the needs of the state and the need for uniformity, both in the state code and
among the codes of other states. The Committee is currently reviewing all
the proposed changes it has adopted in preparation for compiling the results
for presentation to the Mississippi Legislature for its consideration.16
The Committee based the proposed revisions on the Model Code,
which virtually all states that have reformed their penal codes have

Original Committee Members: Professor Judith Johnson, chair, Professor Matthew
Steffey, reporter, Judge Fred Banks, co-chair for some period of time, Judge Robert
Gibbs, who also co-chaired for some period of time, Judge Robert Bailey, James Craig,
Judge Bobby DeLaughter, Rusty Fortenberry, Tom Fortner, Buddy McDonald, Rob
McDuff, Bilbo Mitchell, Al Moreton, Professor Ronald J. Rychak, Ed Snyder, Kathy
Sones, Judge Leslie Southwick, Frank Trapp, Senator Bennie Turner, Judge Frank
Vollor, Professor Carol West, and Amy Whitten.
Others who have served on the Committee: Dewitt Allred, Judge George Carlson, Judge
Virginia Carlton, Judge Kay Cobb, Andre DeGruy, Judge Oliver Diaz, David Dykes,
Chris Klotz, Katie Lawrence, Frank McWilliams, Margarette Meeks, Faye Peterson,
Clarence J. Richardson, Judge Larry Roberts, Judge Keith Starrett, Robert Taylor,
Shondra Taylor-Legget, and Philip Weinberg.
Others who attended to help with specific issues: Drs. Phillip Meredith and Reb
McMichael, Professor Cecile Edwards, Judge John Hudson, and Dean Emeritus Jim
Rosenblatt. Judge Tom Broome also provided valuable input.
13. The Committee has been meeting in Jackson at the Mississippi College
School of Law. The law school has furnished the meeting space and paid the research
assistant. In addition, the law school also furnished lunch for the committee for several
years under the leadership of Dean Jim Rosenblatt. We are very grateful for the support
of the law school during all these years. The Administrative Office of the Courts has also
furnished valuable support to the committee by sending out meeting notices and
providing lunch for the committee for several years.
14. See Johnson, supra note 2, at II.
15. See, e.g. infra note 275.
16. The references to the minutes throughout usually reflect the Committee’s
most recent review of the statute, although the Committee may have originally adopted
the statute much earlier.
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referenced.17 The Model Code, discussed more fully in the first article,18
serves as a measure of uniformity among the several codes. Two thirds of
the states have reformed their penal codes and used the Model Code as the
basis for their reforms.19 Thus, although Mississippi comes late to the
process, it may draw from the experience of many other states that have
reformed their penal codes.20
In addition to establishing some uniformity among criminal codes
and crimes, virtually all American law students are introduced to the Model
Code and its version of general definitions, as well as many of its crimes
and defenses.21 Also, courts and commentators frequently cite the Model
Code as persuasive authority.22 Finally, the drafters wrote extensive
comments, explaining the provisions of the Model Code in detail. Although
the comments will not be part of the legislation, lawyers, judges, and courts
often rely on the comments to interpret the Model Code provisions.23
As noted, the Committee chose not to publish separate comments,
other than this series of articles, but to rely instead on the Model Code
comments where appropriate. This series of articles will serve to some
extent as comments, and the Committee approves each article before
publication.
17. Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998).
The Model Code is among the most successful academic law reform projects
ever attempted. In the first two decades after its completion in 1962, more than two thirds
of the states undertook to enact new codifications of their criminal law, and virtually all
of those used the Model Penal Code as a starting point. Id. The Model Code was
developed by the American Law Institute and published in 1961 as a model for states to
reform their penal codes, which most states have done. See Gerald E. Lynch, Revising
the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 297 (2003). The
American Law Institute (hereinafter “ALI”) was organized in 1923 to improve and
clarify the law. It consists of distinguished lawyers, judges, and professors. Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
The American Law Institute is in the process of making some changes to the
Model Code, notably in the area of sex crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE Proposed
§§ 213.0-213.11 (A.L.I. 2015). The original draft of sex crimes was considered outdated
and unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real,
supra at 230-31. The Committee also had to completely redraft the sex crimes sections,
which will be discussed infra. The core provisions of the Model Code, however, have
stood the test of time and there would be little to gain from changing them. See Lynch,
Towards a Model Penal Code, at 297.
18. See Johnson, supra note 2, at III.
19. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, supra, note at 297.
20. Id. at 297-98.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The Model Code divides crimes by seriousness and punishes them
accordingly. The Model Code recognizes three degrees of felonies,24 which
the Committee expanded to four degrees.25 Thus, murder is a felony in the
first degree,26 along with aggravated forms of rape,27 robbery,28 and
kidnapping.29 Manslaughter is a felony in the second degree,30 along with
non-aggravated forms of rape,31 robbery,32 kidnapping,33 and others.
Negligent homicide is a felony in the third degree,34 along with nonaggravated burglary, and crimes of similar seriousness.35 The more serious
theft crimes were classified as felonies in the fourth degree,36 along with
others.37

24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
25. Section 6.01. Minutes of the Consulting Grp. on Mississippi Criminal Code
Revision, (September 12, 2014) (hereinafter cited as “Minutes”) (on file with the author).
The Minutes are unpublished but may be accessed by applying to the author.
The proposed sentencing scheme for felonies is as follows:
§ 6.06. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced
to imprisonment, as follows:
(a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term the
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than
twenty one year nor more than ten years, and the maximum of
which shall be life imprisonment;
(b) in the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term the
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than
ten one year nor more than three years, and the maximum of
which shall be ten twenty years;
(c) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term the
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than
1 year, at not less than one year nor more than two years, and
the maximum of which shall be five ten years;
(d) in the case of a felony of the fourth degree, for a term the
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court, and the
maximum of which shall be five years.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
27. Id. at § 213.1(1).
28. Id. at § 222.1(2).
29. Id. at § 212.1.
30. Id. at § 210.3(2).
31. Id. at § 213.1(1).
32. Id. at § 222.1(2).
33. Id. at § 213.1(1).
34. Id. at § 210 (2).
35. Id. at § 221.1(2).
36. Minutes, supra note 26 (September 12, 2012).
37. See, e.g., less serious forms of Criminal Mischief (Minutes, supra note 26
(December 2018)) and Obstruction (Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2019)); as well as
crimes such as Criminal Trespass, (Minutes, supra note 26 (September 2018)), Public
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The Model Code recognizes misdemeanors but does not divide
them according to seriousness.38 The Committee disagreed with this and
divided misdemeanors into four classes, A through D.39 Finally, the Model
Code classifies regulatory offenses as violations,40 which are not considered
true crimes and, thus, not criminal.41 The Committee adopted the violation
category.42
As noted, the first article discussed mens rea and the most serious
crimes against the person, the homicide crimes.43 This article will continue
with the other crimes against the person: assault and battery and related
crimes, kidnapping and related offenses, and sex crimes.
First, I want to explain how I dealt with statutes in this article. If the
statute is relatively short, I put it in the text. If the statute is discussed fully
in the text, but is too long to put in the text, I put the statute in the footnotes
to avoid distracting the reader. Statutes that are long and not necessary to
understanding the text were added to the appendix. We used basically the
same numbers as the Model Code, even if we did not base the statute on the
Model Code. I am distinguishing the sections that were not based on the
Model Code by simply designating those with sections numbers. If I am
referring to the original version of the Model Code, I designated it as the
original version Model Code.44 I otherwise noted changes from the Model
Code with underlining and underlined strikeouts. If we used the Mississippi
statute as the basis for the proposed statute, I indicated changes from the
Mississippi statute with italics and italicized strikeouts. I also drew
extensively on the Model Code comments, since these comments are very
helpful in understanding the rationale of the proposed statutes, especially

Drunkenness (Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2012)), and Disorderly Conduct (Minutes,
supra note 26 (March 2012)).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.08 (AM LAW INST. 1985).
39. See Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2012); (September 2014). The
sentencing scheme for misdemeanors and violations is as follows:
§ 6.08
(a) Sentences of misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the county jail
or to hard labor for the county, within the following limitations:
(1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year.
(2) For a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months.
(3) For a Class C misdemeanor, not more than three months.
(4) For a Class D misdemeanor, not more than one month.
(b) A violation is punished by a fine of not more than $200 $250.
40. Id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04.5 (AM LAW INST. 1985).
41. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 113.
42. See Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2014).
43. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V.
44. I neglected to do this in the first article, using the Model Code designation
throughout.
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when we did not make many changes to the Model Code version. We will
begin with assault, which we adopted from the Model Code.
III. ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND RELATED CRIMES
A. Assault
Article 211 of the Model Code deals with bodily injury that does
not result in homicide, as well as situations in which bodily injury is
threatened or risked.45 These crimes are assault,46 reckless endangerment,47
and terroristic threats.48 The Committee adopted the Model Code’s version
of assault with few changes. Although we did make some additions, there
is no need to separately analyze the version the Committee is proposing and
the Model Code. Mississippi actually based its current assault statute on
the Model Code, adding some enhancements for assaulting designated
public officials, as well as other situations,49 which the Committee retained
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 170 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
47. See id. at § 211.2.
48. See id. at § 211.3.
49. This is the version of § 211.1 adopted by the Committee. Again, the regular
text is the Model Code language, while the underlined portions are additions or changes
to the Model Code. The italicized portions were taken from the Mississippi Code. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7. This statute is also reproduced in Appendix C.
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another; or
(b) criminally negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon;
or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury.
Simple assault is a Class A misdemeanor, except that Simple Assault is a Felony in the
Fourth Degree if committed in the following circumstances against the following
persons:
(a) When acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment at the time of
the assault: a statewide elected official; law enforcement officer; fireman;
emergency medical personnel; public health personnel; social worker, family
protection specialist or family protection worker employed by the Department
of Human Services or another agency; Division of Youth Services personnel;
any county or municipal jail officer; superintendent, principal, teacher or other
instructional personnel, school attendance officer or school bus driver; any
member of the Mississippi National Guard or United States Armed Forces; a
judge of a circuit, chancery, county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge
of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court; district attorney or
legal assistant to a district attorney; county prosecutor or
municipal
prosecutor; court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or
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as well.50 The Committee also added a domestic violence statute, patterned
on the Mississippi statute, which had been adopted by the legislature.51 The
Committee further included the Model Code definitions—which
Mississippi has not adopted—remedying the problem of undefined terms in
the Mississippi statute.52
Assault53 and battery,54 at common law, were originally simple
misdemeanors.55 Similarly, at early common law, attempt to commit any
crime was a misdemeanor.56 This idea of punishing all attempts as
misdemeanors was carried over into American jurisdictions, in which
attempt was often not punished with significant severity.57 Thus, at one
deputy clerk of the court; public defender; or utility worker; or
(b) A legislator while the Legislature is in regular or extraordinary session or
while otherwise acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; or
(c) A person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a person who is a
vulnerable person, as defined in Section 43-47-5; or
(d) A child who is in the process of boarding or exiting a school bus and the
actor is in the course of a violation of Section 63-3-615.
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause a serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life; or
(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another
with a deadly weapon.
Aggravated assault under paragraph (a) is a felony of the second degree; aggravated
assault under paragraph (b) is a felony of the third degree.
See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).
50. See Id. italicized portion of the statute.
51. Section 211.X. See Appendix A for the complete statute. This statute was
taken from the Mississippi assault statute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7, which should
otherwise be repealed. See Appendix C. I am not going to explain in detail current law in
Mississippi that the Committee adopted. I will focus instead on the changes to
Mississippi law that the Committee is proposing.
52. However, the court has recommended in Fleming v. State, 604 So. 2d 280,
293 (Miss. 1992), that the courts look at the Model Code’s definition of “serious bodily
injury.” Although the Model Code defines bodily injury to require “physical pain, illness
or any impairment,” Mississippi has no definition of “bodily injury,” which could lead to
confusion. In Reining v. State, 606 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Miss. 1992), for example, the
court said that “although there are no degrees of bodily injury stated in the statute, a
minor injury is a ‘bodily injury’ even though it may not be a traumatic injury.”
53. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
54. See id. at 175. The ALI decided to use the term assault to cover all of the
conduct proscribed, although many of the situations are more accurately termed batteries
because this is the traditional term for such criminal conduct. The ALI also considered
that since assault is the more familiar term, keeping the familiar terminology would
enhance the acceptability of the Model Code. See id. at 174-75 n.1.
55. See id.at 175 (battery); see also id. at 180 (assault).
56. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 213 n. 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
57. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.2(a) (5th ed. 1986).
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time, a defendant could get the death penalty for rape but could be charged
only with a misdemeanor for an attempted rape.58 In addition, attempt
required the defendant to come very close to commission of the target
offense.59
The Model Code’s version of attempt, which the Committee
adopted,60 corrects both problems, punishing attempt as severely as the
crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial step that
strongly corroborates the defendant’s intent, rather than requiring the
defendant to be close to success.61 Because attempt at common law was a
misdemeanor, various versions of aggravated assault were devised by
legislation to punish more seriously such crimes as attempted murder and
attempted rape.62 Because attempt is punished more severely under the
Model Code, there is no longer the same need for aggravated assault.63
Nevertheless, assault under the Model Code was still divided into simple
and aggravated assault, but without the pressing need to fill in the gap left
by the earlier practice of punishing all attempts as misdemeanors.64
1. Simple Assault
Simple assault combines three related ideas, including common law
assault, common law battery, and assault under the definition derived from
torts, which is creating apprehension of a battery.65 Simple assault is
defined as: (1) attempting to cause or “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly”
causing bodily injury to another;66 (2) negligently causing “bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon,”67 or (3) attempting “by physical menace to
put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”68
The common law defined assault as attempt to commit a battery.69
Thus, under the Model Code, the first kind of assault, attempting to cause
bodily injury, is derived from attempting to commit a battery; however, the
drafters did not believe that attempt to cause merely an offensive touching,
which was sufficient for common law battery, should be sufficient for
58. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
59. Id. at 184.
60. See Minutes, supra note 26 (October, November 1996).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 181-82.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See infra discussion accompanying notes 70-94.
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
67. Id. Section 211.1(1)(b).
68. Id. Section 211.1(1)(c).
69. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 58 at § 16.1(a).
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criminal liability.70 Consequently, the Model Code requires that the
defendant attempt to cause bodily injury, which the Model Code defines as
“physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”71 The
Committee adopted this definition.72 While under the common law, it was
possible that threatening to spit on another would be sufficient to be an
assault, under the Model Code, this would not be sufficient. Other forms
of offensive touching that do not constitute bodily injury are treated
elsewhere.73
In addition, the Model Code does not require that assault be closer
than other attempts to the completion of the target crime of battery, as
required by the common law,74 by applying the general attempt statute to
assault.75 Attempt is defined in section 5.01 of the Model Code as
purposely taking a substantial step that strongly corroborates the
defendant’s intent.76 Thus, assault will now include preparatory conduct
that should be intercepted.77 Under this definition, the prior prevailing view

70. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.0(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
These are the definitions adopted by the Committee for this section. They are virtually
unchanged from the proposed Model Code definitions. The stricken portion represents
the only change:
§ 211.0. Definitions
In this Article, the definitions given in § 210.0 apply unless a different meaning plainly is
required.
§ 210.0. Definitions.
In Articles 210-213, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) “human being” means a person who has been born and is alive;
(2) “bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition;
(3) “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ;
(4) “deadly weapon” means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument,
material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is
intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018). These definitions were inadvertently left out of
the previous article that included the homicide crimes, to which these definitions also
apply.
72. Id.
73. Such conduct may, for example, be dealt with as disorderly conduct under §
250.2 or as harassment under § 250.4. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185
(AM. LAW INST. 1980).
74. See id. at 184.
75. See id.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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that the defendant had to have the present ability to carry out the battery is
consequently also not required.78
In keeping with tradition, the Model Code does not use the term
“battery,” but conduct that would be battery, is termed assault.79 Therefore,
the second form of simple assault is “purposely, knowingly or recklessly”
causing “bodily injury to another.”80 This conduct would be simple battery
under the common law,81 except that battery under the common law could
be committed if the defendant was criminally negligent.82 The Model Code
drafters thought that causing bodily injury through criminal negligence,
which requires only an objective standard, was insufficiently culpable to be
criminal. The thought is that if the defendant inadvertently caused bodily
injury, he should not be criminally liable.83 Thus, if the defendant was
criminally negligent in causing only bodily injury, he must be using a
deadly weapon to be guilty of assault.84
As fully discussed in my first article, although the Model Code uses
the term “negligence” throughout, the definition of “negligence” comports
with the definition of criminal negligence.85 This is a major defect in the
Model Code that the Committee and other states have rectified by using the
term “criminal negligence” instead of merely “negligence.”86
Finally, because most states incorporated the tort definition of
assault into their criminal laws, the drafters of the Model Code added a third
definition of simple assault. Under this definition, the defendant is guilty
of simple assault if he “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury.”87 The drafters believed that because
assuming a threatening posture is too common and equivocal, the threat
required should be “serious bodily injury.”88 Also, the drafters believed
78. Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 176 n.14. “The [Model Code] offense was then renamed ‘assault’ on
the grounds that use of the familiar term would enhance acceptability of the Model Code
proposals and that the offense as redefined was more in accord with common usage of
that term.” Id. at 175.
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
81. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 184 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
82. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 58 § 16.2(C).
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
86. See Johnson, supra note 2, discussion accompanying notes 111-113. It
should be noted that Mississippi adopted the Model Code’s version of assault and
retained the language of the Model Code relating to negligence without defining it as
criminal negligence. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7. This statute is also reproduced in
Appendix C.
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
88. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 192-93 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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that merely physically menacing bodily injury, which is defined in part as
“physical pain,” could be too trivial to be criminalized.89 The Committee
agreed with this position, so that physically menacing bodily injury is
insufficient, and that serious bodily injury should be threatened.90 If the
defendant actually intends to cause bodily injury, he will be guilty of assault
under the first subsection.91 In addition he may also be guilty of the felony
of terroristic threatening under Section 211.3.92 Other situations involving
verbal, rather than physical menace, may constitute other crimes, such as
attempted robbery.93
The Committee did make two changes to the Model Code’s version
of simple assault. One was the addition of enhanced punishments based on
official status and other circumstances of the victim, which was preferred
by the legislature in the current statute.94 The second change was to
eliminate some of the following: The Model Code added to simple assault
that “simple assault is a misdemeanor, unless committed in a fight or scuffle
entered into by mutual consent, in which case, it is a petty misdemeanor.”
The Committee proposes that the italicized portion not be included.95 In
addition, the Committee classified assault as a Class A misdemeanor,
except for the victim status enhancements noted above, which would be
fourth degree felonies.96 The following forms of aggravated assault are
classified as felonies.
2. Aggravated Assault
Even though the need for aggravated forms of assault is not as
pressing under the Model Code proposals because of the more serious
punishment for attempt as discussed above,97 there is still a need for some
forms of aggravated assault not covered by attempt to commit other violent
felonies.98 Thus, the Model Code punishes attempting to “cause serious
bodily injury” or causing “such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of

89. Id.
90. See Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).
91. See supra note 50.
92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985), discussed infra
Section III. C.
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 193 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
94. See supra note 50; Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).
95. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).
96. See supra note 50.
97. See supra discussion accompanying notes 57-65.
98. See infra discussion accompanying notes 100-112.
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human life” as aggravated assault, a second degree felony.99 The attempt
to “cause or purposely or knowingly” causing “bodily injury to another with
a deadly weapon” is classified as a third degree felony.100
It is obvious that attempting to inflict serious bodily injury should
be an aggravating factor for simple assault of the attempted-battery type,
which only requires attempted bodily injury. It is also clear that causing
such injury should be an aggravating factor for simple assault of the type
that would otherwise be simple battery under the common law.101
Similarly, “causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon” is a common
aggravation in statutory forms of aggravated assault.102 However, causing
such injury “purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” requires some
explanation.
This explanation begins with the definition of murder under the
Model Code, which includes criminal homicide committed purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.103 Because attempt requires that
the defendant act purposefully, the only type of murder that may be
attempted is purposeful murder.104 The other forms of murder that require
only knowledge or extreme recklessness may not be punished as attempt.105
Thus, the common law result would be that one who was acting extremely
recklessly and brought about the death of a person was guilty of a serious
felony. However, one with the exact same state of mind whose victim did
not happen to die was guilty of misdemeanor battery, if the victim was
injured. If the victim was not injured, the actor would be not be guilty of
any crime.106 Therefore, the Model Code has filled an important gap by
punishing as a second degree felony conduct that results in serious bodily
injury, when the defendant is acting with the state of mind required for
murder but is not acting purposefully.107
As noted, a deadly weapon is a common aggravating factor, so when
the defendant attempts to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon, he is

99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
100. Id. at § 211.1(2)(b).
101. See supra discussion accompanying notes 54-57.
102. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 191 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1). See Johnson, supra note 2, at n.183.
104. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 58 at § 11.3(a) (5th ed. 1986).
105. Id.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The
person who shoots at random into a crowd and does not injure anyone will be guilty of
reckless endangerment. See infra discussion accompanying notes 120-26.
107. Id.
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guilty of a third degree felony.108 “Deadly weapon” is defined by the Model
Code as “any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or
substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or
is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury.”109 The Committee adopted this definition but eliminated the
requirement that the weapon “be known to be” capable of producing death
or serious bodily injury.110 The Model Code broadly defined deadly
weapon to account for various instruments that a defendant might choose
to bring about the bad result, such as automobiles, poisons, chemicals,
explosives, as well as the obvious, guns and knives.111
As discussed above, the Mississippi legislature added various other
aggravating factors that the Committee incorporated into the statute,
including assault against public officials or a child boarding a school bus.112
Finally, as noted earlier, the legislature passed a separate domestic violence
statute that the Committee retained as a separate statute, making no
changes, except to conform the punishment to the Committee’s version of
the Model Code penalties.113
The two other offenses in Article 211 fill in gaps left in the common
law, which were only partially filled by specific statutes.114 Section 211.3,
terroristic threats,115 penalizes serious behavior that went unpunished under
the common law because it was not considered an assault or an attempt
under the common law.116 Section 211.2, reckless endangering, covers
other possible situations in which the defendant could recklessly endanger
another, other than reckless driving or reckless use of firearms, which were
commonly specifically proscribed.117
B. Reckless Endangering
Prior to the Model Code, only discrete forms of reckless behavior
not resulting in injury were commonly criminalized, such as driving
recklessly and reckless use of firearms.118 Some states added more
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
109. Id. at § 210.0(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
110. Minutes, supra note 26 (April, 2018).
111. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 191 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
112. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).
113. Section 211.X Domestic Violence. See Appendix A for the full statute.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 would be repealed by the foregoing. See Appendix C.
114. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
116. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195-96 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
118. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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categories, such as dropping objects from bridges and placing an
obstruction on a railroad track.119 The Model Code replaces such statutes
with a general prohibition of any reckless conduct that places another in
danger of death or serious bodily injury. The Committee adopted the
following version of reckless endangering:
§ 211.2. Recklessly Endangering Another Person.
A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he recklessly engages
in conduct that which places or may place another person in danger
of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness and danger shall be
presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the
direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm
to be loaded.120
The Model Code added a presumption of recklessness when the defendant
merely aims a firearm at another person.121 If harm actually results, the
defendant would be guilty of assault122 or manslaughter, depending on the
severity of the result.123 Obviously, the defendant who acts with a reckless
state of mind that would have resulted in a felony, if the criminally
proscribed result had occurred, should be criminally liable even if the result
does not occur. The crime is a broad catchall, so the Committee classified
it as a Class A misdemeanor.124
In addition to reckless endangering, the Model Code filled another
gap regarding threats to commit a crime to intimidate a person or the general
public by developing the new crime of “terroristic threats.”125
C. Terroristic Threats
Section 211.3 deals with situations in which the defendant threatens
to commit a crime of violence in order to terrorize another person or a group
of persons. The section applies to serious threats that impair public order
or personal security.126 Prior law usually covered only criminal coercion,
which is also proscribed generally in section 215.5,127 or crimes that are
119. Id. at 195-96.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE §211.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
121. Id.
122. See supra note 50.
123. If the incident resulted in the death, the defendant would be guilty of
reckless manslaughter. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. B.2 (c).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 200-02 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
126. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 215.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

216

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 38:3

designed to force the victim to engage in prescribed behavior.128 For
example, robbery requires a threat of violence to compel theft,129 and
extortion requires a threat that also may include a threat of violence.130
Both of these crimes are also covered specifically in the Model Code.131
Prior law, however, did not proscribe a threat simply for the purpose of
terrorizing, which is the purpose of terroristic threats under section 211.3.132
A terroristic threats charge is designed to punish the person who
makes phone calls or writes letters to incite fear and distress in the victim,
rather than to extort money. In addition, the crime covers the situation in
which the defendant makes the threat to cause evacuation of a public place
and to cause serious alarm and inconvenience, regardless of whether the
defendant intends to carry out the threat.133
The Committee made some changes to the Model Code’s
proposal.134 The underlined portions were added by the Committee, and
the stricken portions were deleted from the original Model Code version:
§ 211.3. Terroristic Threats
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he
explicitly or implicitly threatens to commit any crime of
violence serious bodily injury, kidnapping or arson with
purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a
building, place of assembly, or facility of public
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public
inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror or inconvenience.135
The Committee added the language “explicitly or implicitly” to
cover a threat such as “I know where your children are,” which is an
implicit, but not an explicit, threat. The Committee believed that for the
defendant to be liable, he should not have to specify a crime to the victim,

128. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
129. Id.
130. Id. The Committee is proposing to include extortion as a type of robbery.
See Minutes supra note 26 (August 2020).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1 and 223.4. Sex crimes discussed infra at V.
also may involve threats.
132. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
Mississippi actually does have a threatening letter statute, but the punishment makes it a
misdemeanor. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-85. This statute would be replaced by the
Terroristic Threats statute. See infra discussion accompanying note 136.
133. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 207 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
134. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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but only make an implicit threat.136 We also defined the crimes that would
be subject to the threat requirement to preclude inclusion of a threat to
commit a simple assault, which would not be serious enough to justify
punishment for a third degree felony.137 Finally, the defendant does not
have to intend to terrorize but must only act “in reckless disregard of
causing such terror or inconvenience.”138 If the victim is restrained in order
to terrorize him, the crime would relate to kidnapping and related crimes,
which we will discuss next.
IV. KIDNAPPING AND RELATED CRIMES
Article 212 of the Model Code was intended to restructure the law
of kidnapping.139 The main problem with many kidnapping laws, as
exemplified by the current Mississippi law,140 is that the laws are too broad,
imposing severe penalties for what could be trivial conduct.141 For this
reason, the Model Code divided kidnapping and related offenses into
crimes of diminishing seriousness, from section 212.1, which may be a first
degree felony; to felonious restraint in section 212.2, which is a third degree
felony; to false imprisonment, which is a misdemeanor.142 Article 212 also
includes the related crimes of interference with custody in section 212.4
and criminal coercion in section 212.5.143
The Committee changed the Model Code’s term “kidnapping”
under section 212.1 to “Aggravated Kidnapping” and rearranged the

136. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018). This statute would replace the
following Mississippi statute:
§ 97-3-85. Threats and intimidation; by letter or notice
If any person shall post, mail, deliver, or drop a threatening
letter or notice to another, whether such other be named or
indicated therein or not, with intent to terrorize or to
intimidate such other, he shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months,
or by fine not more than five hundred dollars, or both.
The Committee is still working on an internet bullying and assisted suicide statute.
137. See supra note 26.
138. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
139. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 210 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
140. See infra discussion accompanying notes 177-81.
141. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 210 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
142. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
143. The Committee had added Interstate Removal of a Child Under Age
Fourteen by Noncustodial Parent or Relative but decided that since this statute was part
of a uniform law, we would delete it in favor of the current Mississippi scheme. MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-51. Compare Minutes, supra note 26 (October 1998) with Minutes,
supra note 26 (June 2018).
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statute, as will be noted below.144 However, the basic concept of the Model
Code’s most serious kidnapping offense was retained.145 The Committee
also designated section 212.2 as simply “kidnapping,” again retaining the
Model Code’s basic idea expressed in the original version of section 212.2,
which the Model Code termed “felonious restraint.”146
A. Kidnapping (Aggravated Kidnapping)
Section 212.1 of the Model Code defines the most serious offense
as kidnapping,147 which, as noted, the Committee re-named “aggravated
kidnapping.”148 This most serious form of kidnapping involves substantial
removal or confinement for specified purposes: to hold for ransom or
reward, to interfere with the performance of a governmental function, to
inflict bodily injury or to terrorize anyone, or to facilitate the commission
of a felony.149 The removal or confinement must be by “force, threat or
144. The Committee adopted the following:
Section 212.0 Definitions
1) In this article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 apply unless a different
meaning plainly is required.
2) For purposes of this Article, “unlawful” or “unlawfully” refers to any
affirmative violation of legal duty, whether it amounts to a violation of the
criminal law, civil law, or administrative regulation.
Minutes, supra note 26 (August 2019). See supra note 72 for the definitions in Section
210.0 that apply.
145. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
146. Id.
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
148. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
149. This is the original Model Penal Code version:
§ 212.1 Kidnapping. A person is guilty of kidnapping if he
unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or
business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is
found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial
period in a place of isolation, with any of the following
purposes:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter;
or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function.
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor
voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to
trial, in which case it is a felony of the second degree. A
removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this
section if it is accomplished by force, threat or deception, or, in
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deception (or in the case of a person who is under the age of fourteen or
incompetent, without consent of a parent, guardian or other person
responsible for general supervision of his welfare).”150 Under the Model
Code, kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the victim is
voluntarily released without serious bodily injury prior to trial. If not,
kidnapping is a felony of the second degree.151 The Committee agreed with
most of the Model Code’s ideas, but rearranged, re-named, and re-worded
the statute as follows:
Section 212.1 Aggravated Kidnapping.
A person is guilty of aggravated kidnapping if, by force,
threat or deception (or in the case of a person who is under
the age of 14 or incompetent, without consent of a parent,
guardian or other person responsible for general supervision
of his welfare) he:
(a) confines or removes another to hold for ransom
or reward, or as a shield
or hostage; or
(b) removes another from his place of residence or
business, or moves him
a substantial distance from
the vicinity where he is found, or confines another for a
substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the
following purposes:
(1) to facilitate commission of any felony or
flight thereafter; or
(2) to inflict serious bodily injury on or to
terrorize the victim or
another.
Aggravated Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless
the defendant establishes, as an affirmative defense, that the
defendant voluntarily released the victim without serious
bodily injury in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is
a felony of the second degree. That the defendant voluntarily
released the victim without serious bodily injury and in a
safe place prior to trial mitigates aggravated kidnapping

the case of a person who is under the age of 14 or incompetent,
if it is accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian
or other person responsible for general supervision of his
welfare.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
150. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 223-24 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
151. Id. at 227.
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from a first degree felony to a second degree felony and need
not be proven in any prosecution under this section.152
At noted above, one of the main deficiencies in the then-current
statutes cited by the drafters of the Model Code was that kidnapping could
apply to trivial conduct that amounted to some exercise of physical control
over another person, such as a situation in which a defendant merely held
another person by the arm to make a point.153 Thus, what would otherwise
be kidnapping was divided into three separate crimes, punishing less
serious forms of physical restraint more proportionately. The challenge
was to distinguish this other less serious conduct from kidnapping.154
One of the important innovations of the Model Code was to confine
kidnapping to specified purposes. In addition to requiring that the
defendant use force, threat, or deception,155 the defendant must also remove
the victim with a purpose to: (a) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or
as a shield or hostage, or (b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight
thereafter, or (c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another, or (d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function.156 The Committee adopted purposes (a) through (c), but
did not adopt subsection (d) for reasons discussed below.157
Another problem with earlier kidnapping statutes that had been
developed in this country was derived from substantially weakening or
eliminating the common law requirement of asportation or moving the
victim. Under these statutes, kidnapping could be charged in any type of
unlawful physical control of another, such as in the case of rape.158 The
need for removing the asportation requirement might have been caused by
inadequacies in the law of attempt, as discussed with regard to the assault
crimes.159
To summarize the earlier discussion, at common law, attempt to
commit any crime was a misdemeanor.160 The Model Code’s version of
attempt punishes attempt as severely as the crime intended in most cases.
Attempt under the Model Code also requires only that the defendant’s act
152. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). Compare this version with the Model
Code version cited supra note 150.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
154. Id.
155. Or, in the case of a child under fourteen or an incompetent person, without
consent of the parent or guardian. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
157. See infra discussion accompanying note 167.
158. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 211 cmt. at 212 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
159. See supra discussion accompanying notes 57-63.
160. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).

2020] REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART II

221

be a substantial step to be sufficient for attempt, rather than requiring the
defendant to be close to success.161 Therefore, using kidnapping to punish
behavior that is preparation for another crime is no longer necessary.162
The Committee agreed with the idea that kidnapping should
contemplate unlawful substantial removal or confinement with regard to the
other specified purposes, but thought that “holding for ransom and using as
a shield” should be treated as aggravated kidnapping without requiring that
the victim be moved a substantial distance.163 Thus, if the defendant
removes or confines the victim to hold him for ransom or to use him as a
hostage, he is guilty of aggravated kidnapping. Otherwise, to be guilty of
kidnapping under section 212.1, the defendant must—with purpose to
inflict serious bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or to facilitate a
felony—remove the victim from his residence or move him a substantial
distance or confine the victim for a substantial period of time.164
One of the important innovations of the Model Code was to limit
kidnapping to specified purposes, as noted above.165 The Committee
agreed that the following are important and clear purposes: to hold for
ransom or reward, to use the victim as a shield or hostage, to terrorize the
victim, or to facilitate a crime. However, with regard to the purpose of
interfering “with the performance of any governmental or political
function,” the Committee feared that interference with a public function
would be too broad, so we are not proposing the adoption of that part of the
Model Code.166
The original version of the Model Code requires that the
confinement or removal must be “unlawful,” which is defined as “by force,
threat or deception.”167 However, in the case of a child under fourteen or
one who is incompetent, the thought was that either could be enticed
without consent of a guardian, so that force, threat, or deception was not a
necessary requirement. The Committee re-drafted the statute, so that there
is no need to specify that the confinement or removal is unlawful because
the purposes for which the person is confined or removed would clearly be
unlawful: to hold for ransom or as hostage or to commit a crime or to
terrorize him. The Committee believed that the word “unlawful” in this
statute would cause confusion.168

161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
162. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
163. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
164. Id.
165. See supra discussion accompanying notes 148-150.
166. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
167. Id.
168. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).

222

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 38:3

The Committee agreed with the Model Code’s idea that, if the
defendant voluntarily releases the victim without serious bodily injury
before the trial, the crime should be reduced to a second-degree felony. The
extreme sanction of a first degree felony, which is also imposed only for
murder and a very few aggravated felonies,169 should be reserved for
situations in which the victim is not released voluntarily or is seriously
injured.170 Section 210.0(3), as adopted by the Committee, defines “serious
bodily injury” as any physical injury that “creates a substantial risk of death
or that causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”171 The
rationale is to encourage the defendant to voluntarily release the victim
alive and not seriously harmed. The great fear in all kidnapping cases is
that the victim will be killed in the process. Deterring this result is surely a
worthy goal.172
The Committee believed that the affirmative defense of “releasing
the victim prior to trial” should be clarified, in addition to the other changes
discussed above. The Committee reporter, Matthew Steffey, redrafted the
statute to reflect these changes, as he often did, and we adopted this version,
dividing the crime into aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping,173 the latter
having been denominated “felonious restraint” in the original Model Code
version.174 We also clarified that, as opposed to the usual procedure for
affirmative defenses under the Model Code, the prosecution does not have
the burden of disproving this affirmative defense once it is raised.175
The current Mississippi statute concerning kidnapping suffers from
all the deficiencies cited by the drafters of the Model Code.176 First, it could
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
170. Id.
171. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018); note 72.
172. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 233 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
173. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
174. See infra notes 183-84.
175. Compare infra note 256 with discussion accompanying notes 174-76.
176. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53. Kidnapping; punishment
Any person who, without lawful authority and with or without
intent to secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any
other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with
intent to cause such person to be confined or imprisoned
against his or her will, or without lawful authority shall
forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any vulnerable person as
defined in Section 43-47-5 or any child under the age of
sixteen (16) years against the will of the parents or guardian
or person having the lawful custody of the child, upon
conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the
jury in its verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the
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apply to trivial conduct. In addition, the same conduct by different
defendants could be punished by a sentence from one year to thirty years,177
a defect in the Mississippi criminal statutes generally, and one of the main
reasons Mississippi ranks dead last among criminal codes.178 The current
statute does not require asportation or even confinement for a substantial
period of time, so that kidnapping could be charged in addition to other
crimes against the person that require restraint, such as rape.179
For these reasons, this statute would be repealed by the adoption of
sections 212.1-3. Section 212.2 (felonious restraint) and section 212.3
(false imprisonment) are lesser included offenses to kidnapping180 and will
now be discussed.
B. Felonious Restraint (Kidnapping)
The Committee adopted the Model Code version of felonious
restraint,181 renaming it simply “kidnapping.”182 I will refer to it as “simple
kidnapping” for purposes of this discussion to distinguish it from the more
serious form of the crime, which the Committee denominated “aggravated
kidnapping.” The Committee proposes the following:
Section 212.2 Kidnapping
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he knowingly:
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing
him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
Kidnapping is a felony of the third degree.183
penalty at imprisonment for life, the court shall fix the penalty
at not less than one (1) year nor more than thirty (30) years in
the custody of the Department of Corrections.
This section shall not be held to repeal, modify or amend any
other criminal statute of this state.
177. Id.
178. See Johnson, supra note 2, at IV.
179. For example, rape requires restraint. See infra discussion accompanying
note 290.
180. See Appendix D.
181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Original Model Penal
Code version:
Section 212.2 Felonious Restraint
A person commits a felony of the third degree if he knowingly:
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily
injury; or
(b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
182. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
183. Id.
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Section 212.2 applies when the defendant holds another in
involuntary servitude or unlawfully restrains another in such a manner as to
expose him to risk of serious bodily injury.184 Section 212.2 requires only
that the victim be subjected to the risk of serious bodily injury.185
Simple kidnapping is distinguished from aggravated kidnapping
by eliminating the elements of substantial removal or confinement required
for aggravated kidnapping, as well as defining less serious purposes than
those required for aggravated kidnapping.186 For example, if a defendant
unlawfully restrains another person for an insubstantial period of time and
exposes him to a risk of serious bodily injury even in a public place, he may
be guilty of kidnapping but not aggravated kidnapping. In such cases, the
defendant has not substantially removed or isolated the victim from
protection of the law, which could have increased the dangerousness of the
crime. Simple kidnapping does not require the specified purposes of
subjecting the victim to serious bodily injury, terrorizing or holding him for
ransom or as a hostage, or facilitating the commission of a crime.187 For
example, if the defendant uses a weapon to force the victim to drive him to
another place, he is guilty of aggravated kidnapping if he is escaping from
a bank robbery. If he is not fleeing the commission of a crime and has none
of the other purposes specified for aggravated kidnapping but just needs a
ride, he may be guilty of simple kidnapping. This is because he is armed
and is exposing the victim to risk of serious bodily harm.188 Simple
kidnapping is still a serious felony of the third degree.189
While aggravated kidnapping requires that the defendant act
purposefully, in other words that he intends one of the specified purposes,
simple kidnapping requires the defendant to act knowingly, which means
that he must know that “his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist.”190 Accordingly, he must be aware that he is
unlawfully restraining his victim and exposing him to the risk of danger.
In simple kidnapping, the action giving rise to a risk of danger must
amount to unlawful restraint. Because aggravated kidnapping requires
serious purposes, the necessity of adding the term “unlawful” to the statute
is obviated. However, sections 212.2 and 212.3 do not require the same
purposes. Consequently, for simple kidnapping and false imprisonment,
there is a need for the restraint to be unlawful, which the Committee defined
as:
184. See supra note 72 for the definition of serious bodily injury.
185. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
186. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
187. Id. at 241.
188. Id.
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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Section 212.0 Definitions
....
2) For purposes of this Article, “unlawful” or “unlawfully” refers to
any affirmative violation of legal duty, whether it amounts to a
violation of the criminal law, civil law, or administrative
regulation.191
This definition applies to the final form of unlawful restraint, section 212.3,
False Imprisonment, as well.
As discussed below with regard to section 212.4 (interference
with custody), restraint by one parent in violation of a custody order would
be included within the prohibition of section 212.2 as “unlawful” conduct.
However, the purposes required for kidnapping, involuntary servitude or
risk of serious bodily injury, would generally not be present. If they were,
the non-custodial parent could be guilty of kidnapping, but not aggravated
kidnapping, which requires that the child be taken without consent of a
parent.192 The effect of all this is to include within the kidnapping offense
removal of a child under the age of fourteen by a stranger without the
consent of an appropriate guardian. The offense was not designed to
broaden liability for parental conduct nor to extend the offense of
kidnapping into intra-family custody disputes.193
We will now look at false imprisonment, the least serious form of
unlawful restraint.
C. False Imprisonment
The Committee adopted the Model Code version of false
imprisonment, classifying it as a Class A misdemeanor:194
Section 212.3 False Imprisonment
A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he knowingly
restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his
liberty.195
While simple kidnapping under section 212.2 includes unlawful restraint
that exposes the victim to risk of serious bodily injury or that holds another

191. Minutes, supra note 26 (July 2019).
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
193. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 251 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
194. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
195. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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in involuntary servitude,196 false imprisonment requires only that the
defendant “knowingly restrain another unlawfully so as to interfere
substantially with his liberty.”197 Both offenses require knowledge of the
unlawful nature of the restraint,198 as defined above.199 The restraint must
be unlawful, so that restraint of a child by a parent, for example, would not
be false imprisonment; however, restraint of a child unlawfully by another
adult would constitute false imprisonment. The restraint must also
“substantially” interfere with the victim’s liberty to preclude application in
situations that may justify civil, but not criminal, sanction.200
Because of the serious purposes required for simple kidnapping, it
is a felony of the third degree, while false imprisonment is a
misdemeanor,201 which the Committee classified as a Class A
misdemeanor.202 Furthermore, criminal coercion under section 212.5,
discussed below,203 may cover other situations in which the victim’s liberty
is interfered with.204 Because of the possibly broad coverage of section
212.3 and because more serious conduct is punished in other sections, a
Class A misdemeanor punishment was considered appropriate.205
The next statutes are related to kidnapping, but without the
requirement of physical restraint. While simple restraint of a child by a
parent would not be considered criminal, interfering with custody of a child
could be.
D. Interference With Custody
Section 212.4 defines the offense of interference with custody.206
The offense applies to situations in which the defendant takes or entices a
196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
198. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
199. Section 212.0(2), as added by the Committee. See supra discussion
accompanying note 192.
200. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 247 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
201. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2
(AM. LAW INST. 1985).
202. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
203. See infra Section IV. E.
204. In addition, MODEL PENAL CODE §243.1 (AM LAW INST. 1985) applies to
restraint amounting to official oppression, such as illegal arrest. See Minutes, supra note
26 (July 2011) for the Committee’s version of §243.1.
205. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM LAW INST. 1985). The committee
originally adopted a statute borrowed from the Uniform Child Custody Act but decided
to retain the uniform act as it stands in the Mississippi Code. See Minutes, supra note 26
(June 2018).
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child or committed person from lawful custody. The Committee adopted
the Model Code version, with a few changes, as noted:
Section 212.4
(1) Custody of Children. A person commits an offense if he
knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of
18 from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful
custodian, when he has no privilege to do so. It is an affirmative
defense that:
(a) the actor reasonably believed that his action was
necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare;
or
(b) the child, being at the time not less than 14 years old,
was taken away at its own instigation without enticement
and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or
against the child.
Proof that the child was below the critical age gives rise to
a presumption that the actor knew the child's age or acted
in reckless disregard thereof. The offense is a Class A
misdemeanor unless the actor, not being a parent or person
in equivalent relation to the child, acted with knowledge
that his conduct would cause serious alarm for the child's
safety, or in reckless disregard of a likelihood of causing
such alarm, in which case the offense is a felony of the
third fourth degree.
(2) Custody of Committed Persons. A person is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor if he knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any
committed person away from lawful custody when he is not
privileged to do so. “Committed person” means, in addition to
anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected or
delinquent child, mentally defective or insane person, or other
dependent or incompetent person entrusted to another’s custody by
or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of
law.207
Interference with custody could occur if the child is taken from a
parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian. Thus, the non-custodial parent
could be guilty of interference with custody, rather than kidnapping, which
could have been charged under earlier statutes.208 The section is drafted in
part to limit the intrusion of the criminal law into child custody disputes but
207. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
208. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 249 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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at the same time to permit criminal intervention in appropriate cases.209
Section 212.4 also applies when a defendant takes or entices from lawful
custody a person who has been committed.210 Section 212.4 is a lesser
included offense to kidnapping in cases in which the kidnapping purposes
cannot be shown, but custody has been infringed on by persons having no
legal authority to do so.211
As opposed to simple and aggravated kidnapping, which protect
against abduction causing physical danger, extortion, terrorization, or
involuntary servitude,212 section 212.4 is directed at interference with
lawful custody of children and committed persons.213 Because the person
interfering with custody will often be another parent, relative, or person
who acts based on the perceived best interest of the child or committed
person, the offense is punished less severely than kidnapping and has
special defenses.214 A kidnapping charge is still possible if the requisite
purposes are present; however, if not, the defendant is guilty of the lesser
offense of interference with custody.215
The offense regarding interference with custody of children requires
that the actor knowingly or recklessly take or entice a child under eighteen
from its legal custodian when he has no privilege to do so.216 Such privilege
could come from consent by the custodian, court order, or statute.217 There
are two affirmative defenses recognized under this subsection. The first is
that the actor “believed that his action was necessary to preserve the child
from danger to its welfare.”218 The Committee decided that the actor should
“reasonably” believe that the action was necessary.219 Reasonable belief
under section 1.13 requires that the actor not be criminally negligent in his

209. Id. at 253.
210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).(AM. LAW INST. 1985).
211. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL
PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (AM. LAW
INST. 1985), which defines lesser included offenses. This will be the subject of a later
article.
212. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1; 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted
by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985).
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985).
214. MODEL PENAL CODE Art 212 cmt. at 251-52 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
215. See supra discussion accompanying note 208.
216. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM LAW INST. 1985).
217. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 257 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
218. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (AM LAW INST.
1985).
219. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
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belief;220 otherwise, the affirmative defense would require the actor’s belief
to be at least reckless to lose the defense. This would occur by operation
of section 2.02, which provides that any element of an offense without a
specified state of mind will generally require recklessness.221 The
Committee usually did not approve of leaving state of mind to the operation
of section 2.02 but preferred wherever possible to specify the state of mind.
The second defense recognizes that a child between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen has a mind of his own. If he arranges for his own
removal without being enticed, and the actor has no purpose of committing
a criminal offense with or against the child, the actor should have a
defense.222
If the child is actually under the age of eighteen under subsection
(1) (or less than fourteen under the affirmative defense provided for in
subsection (1)(b)), there is a presumption that the actor knew or recklessly
disregarded the child’s age.223 This offense is a Class A misdemeanor
unless the actor is not a parent or person in equivalent relation, and he knew
or acted with reckless disregard that the removal would cause serious alarm,
in which case the offense is a felony in the fourth degree.224 In the case of
a parent who may also cause such alarm, the assumption is that fear for
safety is less justified because the child is with a parent who has a protective
instinct with regard to his own child.225 If the child is in fact threatened
with harm, the offense could rise to the level of kidnapping.226
The comments to the Model Code discuss three possible scenarios
to illustrate the effect of the section. The first is the removal of a child over
the age of eighteen who is not under a commitment order. If such a removal
does not involve force, threat, or deception required for aggravated
220. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
General Definitions
....
(16) “reasonably believes” or “reasonable belief” designates a belief that the actor is not
reckless or criminally negligent in holding.
Minutes, supra note 26 (December 2006).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Johnson, supra note
2, at IV.
222. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 258 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
224. Id. (as adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
(AM. LAW INST. 1985). The original version of the MPC only had three degrees of
felonies. The Committee added fourth degree felony. See supra note 26. This offense
was classified as a third-degree felony under the original Model Code Version MODEL
PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
225. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
226. Id.
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kidnapping or any of the purposes required for simple kidnapping, this
would not be kidnapping or interference with custody.227 A child of this
age is capable of consenting, even if the legal guardian has not consented.228
The second situation is removal of a child between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen from the custody of a legal guardian without that
person’s consent. Again, if there is no force, threat, or deception or a
prohibited purpose, the offense would not be kidnapping because the victim
has consented. However, this offense would be interference with custody
because the legal custodian must also consent, unless an affirmative defense
applies.229 Third, if the child is under fourteen and, therefore, incapable of
consenting or is incompetent, this would be kidnapping, if the prohibited
purposes were present. If the prohibited purposes were not shown, the
offense would be interference with custody, absent an affirmative
defense.230
A parent may not be guilty of aggravated kidnapping of his own
underage child because aggravated kidnapping specifically provides for
lack of parental consent,231 but he may be guilty of interference with
custody.232 If one of the prohibited purposes is present, the parent may also
be guilty of simple kidnapping if he knows the restraint is unlawful, which
could include violating a custody order.233 The fact that simple kidnapping
requires knowledge that the conduct is unlawful would prevent the section
from operating in a situation in which custody is in dispute.234 A parent
violating a custody order may also be guilty of false imprisonment under
section 212.3, which is also a misdemeanor, and only requires that the actor
know the restraint to be unlawful, which would include violating a custody
agreement.235
With regard to custody of committed persons under subsection (2),
if the actor knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any committed person
from lawful custody without privilege, he is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor. “Committed person” is defined as anyone “under judicial
warrant, any orphan, neglected or delinquent child, mentally defective or
227. Id. at 253.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (as
adopted by the Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018)(AM. LAW INST. 1985)
with MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
232. Id.
233. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 256 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
234. Id.
235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). (as adopted by the
Committee. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018). (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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insane person, or other dependent or incompetent person entrusted to
another’s custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by
authority of law.”236 Special defenses are not provided in this subsection
because of the fact that the committed person is subject to judicial authority,
which should put the actor on notice that his conduct is wrongful.237
However, as noted in the comments, if any of the defenses to subsection (1)
were present in a case under subsection (2), prosecutorial discretion should
be exercised.238
The next section is related to kidnapping in that the victim’s
freedom of action is restrained. Even if he is not restrained physically, he
is still limited in his actions by the actor’s threats.
E. Criminal Coercion
Section 212.5 defines the offense of criminal coercion.239 This
section is designed as a residual offense, punishing threats to take specified
action with a purpose to unlawfully restrict the freedom of action of another
person to his detriment.240 The Committee adopted the following version
of criminal coercion, making several changes from the original version, as
indicated:
Section 212.5 Criminal Coercion
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if,
with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage
or refrain from engaging in conduct to his detriment, he recklessly
threatens, explicitly or implicitly, to:
(a) commit any criminal offense; or
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to
hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his
credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an
official to take or
withhold action.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b),
(c) or (d) that the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret
to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his
purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
237. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 262 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
238. Id.
239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
240. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 264 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of
the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting
from further misbehavior, making …good a wrong done, refraining
from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes
the other disqualified.
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section
that:
(a) the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret to
be true or the proposed action justified, and
(b)(i) that the primary purpose of the threat was to cause the
other to conduct himself in his own best interest; or
(b)(ii) that a purpose of the threat was to cause the other to
desist from immoral or unreasonable conduct, engage in
behavior from which he could not lawfully abstain, make
good a wrong done by him, or refrain from taking any action
or responsibility for which he was disqualified.
(2) (3) Grading. (a) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the third degree
if the threat is to commit a felony in the first or second degree or the
actor’s purpose is felonious in the first or second degree.
(b) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the fourth degree if the threat is
to commit a felony in the third degree or the actor’s purpose is to
commit a felony in the third degree.
(c) Otherwise, Criminal Coercion is a Class A Misdemeanor.241
Since criminal coercion is a residual offense, it compliments other
offenses involving threats,242 such as extortion243 and robbery,244 both of
which require that the threat be made to acquire property.245 To avoid
overbroad enforcement, criminal coercion applies only to a limited category
of threats that must be made with an improper purpose to limit a person’s
freedom of action.246

241. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 264 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). In
addition, the following crimes also involve threats: Theft of Services under § 223.7,
Terroristic Threats under § 211.3, Assault under § 211.1, Criminal Mischief under §
220.3, and Improper Influence Over Public Officials and Others under § 240.2. See id. In
addition, some of the sex crimes, discussed infra at V. involve threats.
246. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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There are four types of threats. Again, they all must be made with
the purpose of unlawfully restricting another’s freedom of action.247 The
Committee made several changes to the language of the Model Code. First,
the Committee decided that the threat could be “explicit or implicit.”248 The
original Model Code version defined “freedom of action” in the comments,
but not in the statute, to be anything the victim does not want to do or not
do that works to his detriment.249 The Committee decided that this was
unclear, so we added to “freedom of action” in the statute “to engage or
refrain from engaging in conduct.”250 We also eliminated “to his detriment”
because we believed that limiting freedom of action sufficiently defined the
conduct.251
The original Model Code provided that, if the action is for the good
of the person, it is not covered by this section252 since the action must limit
the victim’s freedom of action to his detriment.253 This idea was also
reinforced in the affirmative defenses, discussed below. 254 As noted, the
Committee removed the language “to his detriment,” deciding that a proper
purpose should be an affirmative defense.255

247. Id. at 264.
248. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019).
249. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
250. See supra Committee’s version of the statute § 212.5(2) at discussion
accompanying note 242.
251. Id.
252. Id.
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
254. Id.
255. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The
Committee adopted the Model Code’s scheme for affirmative defenses, which requires
the defendant to raise the defense and the prosecution to prove its absence beyond a
reasonable doubt. Minutes, supra note 26 (October, November, December 2006).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offense unless each
element of such offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is
assumed.
(2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:
(a) Require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless
and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or
(b) Apply to any defense that the Code or another statute
plainly requires the
defendant to disprove by a
preponderance of the evidence; or
....
Thus, absent a statutory requirement, the prosecution must disprove any affirmative
defense not plainly requiring the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
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The original version of the Model Code also required that the actor
restrain the victim’s freedom of action “unlawfully.”256 However, as
opposed to the other sections in this Article that use the term unlawfully—
defining it as “any violation of the criminal law, civil law or administrative
regulation”257—the Model Code comments defined “unlawfully”
differently in this section: The actor has to intend to coerce conduct he has
no legal right to require. Again, this definition was suggested by the Model
Code comments but was not defined in the statute.258 The Committee
deleted the reference to “unlawfully” because the addition to “freedom of
action” of “engaging in or refraining from conduct,” which should cover
what the victim does or does not want to do.259
The list of threats for criminal coercion does not include all the
threats included for extortion, which requires the purpose of acquiring
property; the justification being that this is more obviously wrongful.260
The first threat that could be criminal coercion is to threaten “to commit
any criminal offense.”261 The second is “to accuse anyone of a criminal
offense.”262 The third threat is less obvious and, that is, to threaten to
“expose a secret that would cause the person to be ridiculed, hated, held in
contempt, or that would impair his credit or business repute.”263 The last is
to threaten to “take or withhold official action,” either because the
defendant is an official or because the victim is an official.264
When the actor’s purpose is benign, coercion should not be
criminal. Therefore, the Committee adopted the Model Code’s affirmative
defenses in this regard but restructured and clarified them.265 The
affirmative defenses are designed to prevent interference with legitimate
bargaining and other similar situations.266 The defenses do not apply to
subsection (a) because commission of a crime would never be justified
under this subsection. However, with regard to the other purposes, if the
actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official
action justified, the defense would apply. In addition, the purpose must be
to require the person to correct his unreasonable or immoral behavior, right
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
257. Minutes, supra note 26 (July 2019).
258. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
259. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2019).
260. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 266. The Committee is proposing to
include extortion as a type of robbery. See Minutes supra note 26 (August 2020).
261. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
265. See supra note 256.
266. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 212 cmt. at 267 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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a wrong, or prevent the other person from taking action for which he is
disqualified.267 The original Model Code version used the term
“misbehavior.” The Committee substituted the term “immoral or
unreasonable behavior,” which is the definition suggested by the Model
Code comments.268
Advising a driver to slow down or be reported would be an example
of requiring the person to cease unreasonable or immoral behavior.269 An
example of threatening to expose a secret to encourage the victim to correct
his unreasonable or immoral behavior would be to threaten to disclose an
alcoholic’s secret drinking to force him into treatment. Threatening to
accuse another of theft if he does not return the property would be an
example of righting a wrong within the defense.270 Using a threat to prevent
another from assuming a position for which he is unqualified would also
apply here.271
The Committee refined the grading scheme so that, if the threat is
to commit a felony in the first or second degree or the actor has a purpose
that is felonious in the first or second degree, criminal coercion is a felony
in the third degree. If the felony intended or threatened is a felony in the
third degree, the offense is a felony in the fourth degree. The offense is
otherwise a misdemeanor, which the Committee classified as a Class A
misdemeanor.272
We turn now to the most controversial set of crimes, sex crimes.
V. SEX CRIMES
Article 213 of the Model Code, which relates to sex crimes, was
outdated and unsatisfactory, so the Committee completely revamped the
sex crimes article by referring to Mississippi statutes that existed at that
time.273 The Committee also reviewed the sex crimes statutes of other states
and decided to use Tennessee statutes as a model.274

267. Id. at 268.
268. Id. at 265; Id. at 268.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Minutes, supra note 26 (June 2018).
273. See Minutes, supra note 26 (May, July, August, and September 1999). The
Committee reviewed these recently and added some updates. Minutes, supra note 26
(June 2018).
274. See TN. ST. §§ 39-5-501-506. Since none of the statutes proposed by the
Committee, except for indecent exposure, are based on the Model Code, the reference
will just be to section numbers. These may coincide with the Model Code sections, but
this is only for the sake of consistency.
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After the Committee’s original adoption of its revised sex crimes
statutes, the American Law Institute (ALI) decided to strike Article 213 of
the Model Code and revise it.275 The Committee had presciently managed
to avoid the main criticisms of the later stricken article by not applying sex
crimes to a particular gender of victim or perpetrator,276 loosening the
restrictions on the most serious forms of sexual assault,277 as well as
limiting the marital exemption.278
The efforts by the ALI to revise the Model Penal Code are
ongoing.279 The Committee reviewed the current proposals but decided that
the version we had adopted was preferable for our purposes.280 Using
275. 2012 A.L.I. Proceedings 257.
276. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
277. See id. at §§ 213.1-3.
278. See id. at § 213.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
279. The comment accompanying the stricken article indicated that the
criticisms included “gendered language,” “tight restrictions” on the most serious form of
rape, designating forms of sexual conduct as “deviate,” retention of a broad marital
exemption, “antiquated procedural provisions,” and outdated reasoning and phraseology
in the comments. See id. at §§ 213.0-5.
280. Sections 213.1-5. I will cite these sections in this manner, since we did not
take them from the Model Code, as noted above.
These are the definitions that the Committee adopted for § 213. They will be
discussed as they arise in the discussion.
Section 213.0 Definition
(1) “Coercion” means use of or threat of immediate or future
kidnapping, extortion, force or violence or the use of parental,
custodial, or other official authority over a child less than
fifteen (15) years of age;
(2) “Intimate” parts include the primary genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being;
(3) “Mentally incapacitated” means that at the time of the act
the victim is incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct
due to the mental disease or defect or the influence of a
narcotic, anesthetic or other substance administered to him
without his consent, or due to any other acts committed upon
him without his consent;
(4) “Physically helpless” means the victim is unconscious,
asleep or for any other reason physically or verbally unable to
communicate unwillingness to do an act;
(5) “Sexual contact” includes the knowing touching of the
victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the
knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area
of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s intimate parts,
if that touching can be reasonably construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or the gratification;
(6) “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however, slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object
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Mississippi statutes and looking at other states, as well as the Model Code,
the Committee drafted statutes on rape and aggravated rape, rape of a child,
sexual battery, and aggravated sexual battery.281 The Committee also
adopted a version of indecent exposure based on the Model Code. In
addition, we adopted a limited spousal exception and revised the
Mississippi statute on protective orders and procedure.282 We will begin
with rape and aggravated rape.
A. Section 213.1 Rape; Aggravated Rape
Traditional rape statutes allowed only for a female victim and a
male perpetrator.283 These statutes also required that the victim show that
she used “utmost resistance,”284 which required that the “intensity of the
struggle must reflect the victim’s physical capacity to oppose sexual
aggression; and that her efforts must not have abated during the
encounter.”285 Utmost resistance would not be required if the victim was
raped by the use of “fear of grave harm.”286 Courts often required that the
“woman’s fear must encompass harm of extreme gravity” and that her
reaction be reasonable.287 Essentially, the actor had to give the victim a
reasonable belief of imminent harm.288 The Committee rejected the gender
specific requirement and the requirement of resistance by the victim, as
reflected in the rape and aggravated rape statute proposed, as follows:
Section 213.1 Rape and Aggravated Rape
(1) Rape is the sexual penetration of a victim by the actor or
of the actor by a victim when:
into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the actor’s, or
any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not required;
and
(7) “Spouse” means a married person. “Married Person” means
living together when neither spouse has filed for separate
maintenance or divorce.
(8) “Victim” means the person alleged to have been subjected
to criminal sexual conduct.
281. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
282. Id.
283. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). Although
the Official Comments have been stricken by the ALI, they remain useful for historical
purposes. See supra note 276.
284. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
285. Id. at 305.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 308.
288. Id. at 309.
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(a) the sexual penetration is accomplished by force
or coercion; or
(b) the sexual penetration is accomplished without
consent of the victim and the actor knows or recklessly
disregards that sexual penetration is accomplished without
the consent of the victim; or
(c) the victim is mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless and the actor knows or recklessly disregards that
the victim is mentally incapacitated or
physically
helpless and is incapable of consenting.
Rape is a second-degree felony.
(2) Aggravated rape is rape accompanied by one or more of
the following:
(a) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(b) The actor causes bodily injury to the victim; or
(c) the actor is aided or abetted by one (1) or more
persons; or
(d) the victim is less than sixteen (16) years old.
Aggravated Rape is a first-degree felony.289
Rape is sexual penetration without consent, by coercion, or if the
victim is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. The important
terms are defined in the Committee’s version of Section 213.0.290 “Sexual
penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the
actor’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not
required.”291 With regard to sexual penetration accomplished by coercion,
that term is defined in the Committee’s version of Section 213.0(1) as “use
of or threat of immediate or future kidnapping, extortion, force or violence
or the use of parental, custodial, or other official authority over a child less
than fifteen (15) years of age.”292 The Committee decided to eliminate
“force” from the statute and leave “force” in the definition of coercion. The
word “force” in the statute could mean slight force, which should be
insufficient to be a serious crime. In context of the definition, sandwiched

289. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
290. See supra note 281.
291. Id.
292. Id.

2020] REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART II

239

as it is between threat of a serious felony or violence, force would indicate
something more serious.293
If the sexual penetration is accomplished without consent or the
victim is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, the actor must have
knowledge or be reckless in believing that the victim was consenting under
such circumstances.294 Knowledge would require that the person be aware
that the victim is not consenting.295 Recklessness would only require the
actor to be consciously aware of a substantial risk that the victim is not
consenting.296 “Physically helpless” applies to the situation in which the
victim is unconscious or otherwise physically helpless or unable to
communicate.297 “Mentally incapacitated” applies to the situation in which
the actor administers a drug or other substance against the victim’s will that
renders him incapable of consenting or in the case of mental disease or
defect.298 Obviously there is some overlap among these categories, but the
Committee thought that these were the situations in which culpability is

293. The doctrine of ejusdem generis would apply here. Ejusdem generis is “a
canon of construction that holds that when a general term follows a list of particular
terms, the general terms only applies to things similar.”
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ejusdem_generis.
294. Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2018).
295. The Committee adopted Model Code’s § 2.02 defining knowledge and
recklessness is as follows:
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.
Minutes, supra note 26 (March 2018). See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. A. 1.
296. Id.
297. See supra note 281.
298. Id.
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most serious. The final definition clarifies that “victim means the person
alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct.”299
Aggravated rape is elevated to a felony in the first degree and occurs
when the actor uses a deadly weapon, causes bodily injury, is aided by
another person, or when the victim is younger than sixteen years old.300
“Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.”301 “Deadly weapon” is defined as “any firearm or
other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate
or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”302 The Committee
believed that precise definitions were especially important since
Mississippi lacks crucial definitions in this difficult area.303
The oldest Mississippi statute on rape is termed “Rape; Assault
with Intent to Ravish,” and it requires, among other things, that the victim
be of chaste character, so it has fallen out of use. This statute also only
applies to female victims.304 The statute does have the advantage of a stated
mens rea, which none of the other Mississippi statutes expressly have.305
This statute should be repealed by Section 213.1, among others.306
The Mississippi statute that covers statutory rape also includes a
section that prohibits forcible sexual intercourse with any person, which
includes administering a substance to cause the person to be unable to

299. Id.
300. Section 213.1.
301. Minutes, supra note 26 (April 2018).
302. See supra note 72.
303. See Appendix E. There is a definition section, but it does not include many
of the relevant terms.
304. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71.
305. See statutes listed in Appendix E.
306. See id.
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resist.307 This statute provides for a life sentence.308 This part of the statute,
as noted in common with the other Mississippi statutes on sex crimes,
suffers from having no mens rea requirement.309 In addition there is no
definition of “forcible,” so the force could be anything from slight to
requiring “utmost resistance.”310 This statute should also be repealed by
the rape statutes proposed by the Committee.311 The remainder of the
statutory rape statute would be repealed by the following proposed
section.312
C. Rape of a Child
Under the common law, it was illegal to have sex with someone ten
years of age or younger. Most statutory schemes consider sex with a child
a heinous crime and punish it more severely than rape of a mature person.313
The age cut-off for statutory rape varies from state to state.314 Many states
graduate punishment according to the age of the victim.315 The original
307. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95.
In addition, the following subsection of MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-6597-3-65 also covers
forcible sexual intercourse:
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse
with any person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not
constituting forcible sexual intercourse or statutory rape with
any person without that person's consent by administering to
such person any substance or liquid which shall produce such
stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to
prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be
imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the
penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the
court, in its discretion, may determine.
308. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65. See infra note 318 for the complete statute.
309. See infra statutes cited in Appendix E.
310. See supra discussion accompanying notes 287-89. The caselaw does not
appear to have defined “forcible” either. See, e.g. Madere v. State, 794 So. 2d 200, p.cite
(2001), in which the court said:
People of ordinary intelligence have the ability to understand
what behavior “forcible sexual intercourse” is designed to
discourage. The word “forcible” is no more vague or overly
broad than “forcibly ravish.” We find that the statutory
purpose and meaning of the amended statute, § 97–3–65(3)(a)
(2000), is purely common sense to any reasonable person.
311. See Appendix E.
312. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65.
313. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 324 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 325.
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version of the Model Code provided for strict liability in the case of children
under the age of ten but modified this position in the case of older
children.316 The Committee basically followed this approach but thought
that under eleven years old was more appropriate for strict liability. The
Committee adopted the following statute that would replace statutory rape
under the Mississippi Code:317
316. Id. at 326.
317. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65.
Statutory rape; enhanced penalty for forcible sexual intercourse or
statutory rape by administering certain substances; criminal sexual assault
protection order
(1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when:
(a) Any person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual
intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of
age;
(ii) Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the
person; and
(iii) Is not the person's spouse; or
(b) A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years;
(ii) Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the
person; and
(iii) Is not the person's spouse.
(2) Neither the victim's consent nor the victim's lack of chastity is a
defense to a charge of statutory rape.
(3) Upon conviction for statutory rape, the defendant shall be sentenced as
follows:
(a) If eighteen (18) years of age or older, but under twenty-one (21)
years of age, and convicted under subsection (1) (a) of this section, to
imprisonment for not more than five (5) years in the State Penitentiary
or a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 5,000.00), or
both;
(b) If twenty-one (21) years of age or older and convicted under
subsection (1)(a) of this section, to imprisonment of not more than
thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or a fine of not more than
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or both, for the first offense, and
not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each
subsequent offense;
(c) If eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under
subsection (1)(b) of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State
Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may
determine, but not less than twenty (20) years;
(d) If thirteen (13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years
of age and convicted under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section,
such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in its
discretion, may determine.
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible
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sexual intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that
person’s consent by administering to such person any substance or
liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or
weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction,
shall be imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the
penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its
discretion, may determine.
(b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married
to the victim or not.
(5) In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it
shall not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals,
anus or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to
have sexual intercourse with the child.
(6) (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any
contact with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the
victim and offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual
assault protection order any relief available under Section 93-21-15.
The term of a criminal sexual assault protection order shall be for a
time period determined by the court, but all orders shall, at a
minimum, remain in effect for a period of two (2) years after the
expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and subsequent period of
community supervision, conditional release, probation, or parole.
Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection order, the four
(24) hours of issuance, with no exceptions for weekends or holidays as
provided in Section 93-21-25, and a copy must be provided to both the
victim and offender.
(b) Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General.
(c) It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a
criminal sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a
violation, the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for
the violation of a criminal sexual assault protection order shall run
consecutively to any other sentences imposed on the offender. The
court shall also be empowered to extend the criminal sexual assault
protection order for a period of one (1) year for each violation. The
incarceration of a person at the time of the violation is not a bar to
prosecution under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to prohibit the imposition of any other penalties or
disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy.
(7) For the purposes of this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean a
joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which
the penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female or the
penetration of the sexual organs of a male or female human being in which
the penis or an object is inserted into the genitals, anus or perineum of a
male or female.
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Section 213.2 Rape of a Child
(1)(a) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of
the actor by the victim
when the victim is less than
eleven (11) years old and the actor is at least
sixteen
(16) years old is a first degree felony. Mistake as to the
victim’s age is no defense.
(b) Sexual penetration of the victim’s body by the
actor or of the actor by
the victim when the victim is
less than eleven (11) years old and the actor is less than
sixteen (16) years old is a second degree felony. Mistake as
to
the victim’s age is no defense.
(2) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of
the actor by the victim when the victim is at least eleven (11)
years old but less than sixteen (16) years old and the actor is
at least four years older than the victim is a second degree
felony. It is a defense that the actor neither knew nor
recklessly disregarded that the victim was less than sixteen
(16) years old. Mistake as to the victim’s age is a defense
under this subsection (2).
(3) Sexual penetration of the victim by the actor or of
the actor by the victim is a third-degree felony when the
victim is at least eleven (11) years old but less than sixteen
(16) years old, and the actor is less than 21 years old but at
least four (4) years older than the victim. It is a defense that
the actor neither knew nor recklessly disregarded that the
victim was less than 16 years old. Mistake as to the victim’s
age is a defense under this subsection (3).
(4) A person does not commit an offense under this
section if the victim is the spouse of the actor.318
The Committee was concerned about the across-the-board strict
liability imposed by the Mississippi statute, as well as the narrow age
difference required between the actor and the victim.319 The proposed
statute addresses these concerns by limiting the imposition of strict liability
to rape of a child under eleven. Thus, mistake of age is no defense if the
child is less than eleven, while mistake of age is a defense if the child is at
least eleven. The Committee thought it was highly unlikely that a child
under eleven could ever be mistaken for anything but a child. If the actor
See Alexandra Hutton Oglesby, Eliminating Injustice: Revising Mississippi's Statutory
Rape Laws, 76 MISS. L.J. 1067 (2007), for a criticism of the law.
318. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
319. Id.
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is less than sixteen, the offense is a second-degree felony, otherwise it is a
first-degree felony.320
The proposed statute on rape of a child requires that the actor must
be at least four years older than the victim.321 The current Mississippi
statute has only a three-year age difference,322 which could apply to
students only separated by two or three grades in the same school. Under
the proposed statute, if the victim is between eleven and sixteen, the actor
must either know or recklessly disregard the victim’s age.323 Again, rape
is defined as sexual penetration by the actor of the victim or the victim by
the actor.324 This conduct is punished as a second-degree felony or thirddegree felony if the actor is younger than twenty-one.325
The Committee was aware that there are marriages where the ages
of the victim and actor are within the statute. Thus, if the victim is the
spouse of the actor, there is no offense under this statute.326 However, the
Committee adopted a statute with a limited spousal immunity, which allows
for prosecution of spouses for rape under more conditions than the current
Mississippi spousal exemption.327
C. Section 213.4 Limited Spousal Exclusion; Spousal Rape
The common law recognized a spousal exclusion from rape, so that
a man could not be guilty of raping his wife.328 The basis for this exemption
was the historical treatment of women, especially wives, as chattels.329
Although the latter idea was eventually abandoned, nevertheless, there was
a belief that marriage constituted “a blanket consent to intimacy which the
woman may revoke only by dissolving the marital relationship.”330 Today,
marriage is viewed as an equal relationship that should always only require
consensual sex.331 The Committee adopted the following limited spousal
exclusion, which is presented out of order, since it is an exemption to the
rape statutes just discussed:

320. Compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 with proposed § 213.2.
321. Id.
322. MISS. CODE ANN. Section 97-3-65.
323. Section 213.2(1).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Section 213.2(4).
327. Section 213.4.
328. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 341 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
329. Id. at 343.
330. Id. at 342.
331. Id. at 345.
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Section 213.4 Limited Spousal Exclusion; Spousal Rape
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person does not
commit an offense under this Article if the victim is the
spouse of the actor.
(2) Spousal rape is sexual penetration of one spouse by the
other when:
(a) Sexual penetration is accomplished by coercion
or knowingly without the consent of the victim; or
(b) The actor causes serious bodily injury to the
victim or sexual
penetration is accomplished by the
use or threatened use of a deadly
weapon.
Spousal rape under section (2)(a) is a second-degree felony.
Spousal rape under section (2)(b) is a first-degree felony.332
The Committee decided to maintain a spousal exception but limited
it. The concern is that allegation of this crime could be used as leverage in
divorce actions, so that rape is only an offense if the actor’s state of mind
is more culpable. Thus, spousal rape under section (2)(a) may be charged
when the actor knows that the sexual penetration is without consent or is
accomplished by coercion.333 Knowledge requires the actor to be
consciously aware that the victim is not consenting.334
Under the rape statute, section 213.1, the actor must only be reckless
with regard to whether the victim is consenting.335 The only difference for
spousal rape is that the actor must be practically certain that the spouse is
not consenting, as opposed to being aware of a substantial risk that the
spouse is not consenting.336 Spousal rape under this subsection is a second
degree felony, as is rape under Section 213.1.337 Under subsection (2)(b),
if the sexual penetration causes bodily injury or is accomplished with a
deadly weapon, there is no spousal exemption, and spousal rape is a first
degree felony as it is under Section 213.1.338
Mississippi currently has an apparently very limited general spousal
rape exclusion, which seems to adhere to the outdated view that marriage
includes consent to sex for purposes of rape and sexual battery and is even
named “Defense of Marriage.” The exclusion does not apply if the spouses
332. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
333. Section 213.4.
334. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); discussion
accompanying note 296.
335. Section 213.1.
336. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) with § 2.02(2)(c) (AM LAW
INST. 1985).
337. Compare § 213.1(1) with § 213.4(1).
338. Compare § 213.1(2) with § 213.4(2).
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are separated at the time.339 However, there are two important exceptions
that ameliorate the effect of the exclusion. The most important one is in the
“Defense of Marriage” statute, which provides that “the legal spouse of the
alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if the legal spouse is
engaged in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged
victim.”340 In addition, the exclusion does not apply to forcible sexual
intercourse or administration of a substance rendering the victim helpless,
even if the victim and actor are married, which is contained in another
section.341 The effect of these two sections together makes a distinction
between forcible sexual penetration and sexual penetration merely without
consent. Since there is no clear definition of forcible sexual penetration and
no mens rea stated for when the sexual penetration is without consent, it is
difficult to predict when the exemption will apply.342
The Mississippi marital exclusion applies to sexual battery as well,
except as indicated. Since the Mississippi sexual battery statute requires
sexual penetration, the exemption works out to apply only to cases of actual
sexual penetration.343 Sexual battery as proposed by the Committee would
cover other cases of sexual assault, while the proposed rape statute applies

339. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-99.
Sexual battery, defense of marriage
A person is not guilty of any offense under Sections 97-3-95 [95 sexual
battery; 97 definitions;101 punishment and protective orders] through 97-3103 {other statutes unaffected] if the alleged victim is that person's legal
spouse and at the time of the alleged offense such person and the alleged
victim are not separated and living apart; provided, however, that the legal
spouse of the alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if the
legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of
the alleged victim.
340. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-99.
341. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-65.
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible
sexual intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that
person's consent by administering to such person any substance or
liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or
weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction,
shall be imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its
verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty
at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in
the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may
determine.
(b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married to
the victim or not.
342. See supra note 342.
343. See id; supra discussion accompanying notes 340-43.
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only to sexual penetration.344 The Committee chose to apply Section 213.4,
the marital exemption, only to rape and not to sexual battery, which has its
own exemption for simple sexual battery but not for aggravated sexual
battery.345
D. Section 213.3 Sexual Battery; Aggravated Sexual Battery
The Committee is proposing the following statute to cover sexual
contact not amounting to sexual penetration:
Section 213.3 Sexual Battery; Aggravated Sexual Battery
(1) Sexual battery is sexual contact of a victim by the actor
or
of
the
actor
by
a
victim
if:
(a) The sexual contact is accomplished by force or
coercion or the actor’s
fraudulent misrepresentation
that
the
parties
are
legally
married;
or
(b) The sexual contact is accomplished without
consent of the victim, and
the actor knows or recklessly
disregards that the sexual contact is accomplished without
the
consent
of
the
victim;
or
(c) The victim is mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless, and the actor knows or recklessly
disregards that the victim is mentally
incapacitated
or
physically
helpless;
or
(d) The victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age,
and the actor used
his
supervisory,
disciplinary,
custodial, or parental authority to accomplish
the
sexual
contact.
(e) A person does not commit an offense under this
subsection if the
victim is the spouse of the actor.
Sexual battery is a felony in the fourth degree.
(2) Aggravated sexual battery is sexual battery accompanied
by one or more of the following:
(a) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(b) The actor causes bodily injury to the victim; or
(c) The actor is aided or abetted by one (1) or more
persons; or
(d) The victim is less than sixteen (16) years old.

344. Compare § 213.1 with § 213.3.
345. See § 213.3(1).
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Aggravated sexual battery is a felony in the second
degree.346
Sexual battery was patterned after the rape statute to cover sexual
assault in cases in which there is no sexual penetration.347 “‘Sexual contact’
includes the knowing touching of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other
person’s intimate parts, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering
the immediate area of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s
intimate parts, if that touching can be reasonably construed as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or the gratification.”348 As noted earlier,
Mississippi applies sexual battery only to actual penetration.349 With the
exception of a child fondling statute,350 there is no statute in Mississippi
that punishes sexual assault when there is no penetration. This conduct
would not be punished under the assault statute because even simple assault
requires bodily injury, not just offensive touching.351 Bodily injury is
defined under the Model Code as “physical pain, illness or any impairment
of physical condition.”352 The term is not defined under the Mississippi
Code, which otherwise adopted the language of simple assault from the
Model Code, including bodily injury.353 The Committee believed that
sexual assault, even without penetration, may be just as traumatizing as
sexual penetration and that such assaults should be seriously punished.
There have been bills introduced in the Mississippi legislature to punish
sexual assault, but none has passed.354

346. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
347. Minutes, supra note 26 (November 2018).
348. See supra note 281. This is contrasted with sexual penetration, which
“means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of the victim’s, the actor’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen
is not required.” See id. This definition is essentially the same as the Mississippi
definition of sexual penetration, but the latter only applies to another person, not to
sexual penetration of the actor himself. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-97(a).
349. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-95.
350. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23.
351. See supra note 50.
352. See supra note 72.
353. See supra note 53.
354. Conversation with Caryn Quilter, Staff Attorney, Mississippi State Senate
for almost 30 years. She has been a valuable member of the Committee for almost as
many years. The following are the bills proposed, all of which died in committee: See
H.B 221, 271,1020; S.B. 2420 (2019); H.B. 195, 922; S.B 2273 (2018); H.B. 1368,1382;
S.B. 2900 (2017); H.B. 563, 579; S.B. 2766 (2016); S.B.2094 (2015); H.B. 1058; S.B.
2219 (2013); S.B. 2078 (2012); S.B. 2327, 2525 (2011); H.B. 28; S.B. 2340; S.B. 2715
(2007); S.B.2253 (2009); S.B. 2226 (2008); S.B. 2460 (2006).
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Non-aggravated sexual battery, or simple sexual battery, is a felony
in the fourth degree.355 Such sexual battery is sexual contact by the actor
or actor by the victim.356 There are four situations that may be sexual
battery. The first prohibits sexual contact by coercion or fraudulent
representation of marriage.357 The second addresses sexual contact without
consent of the victim when the actor recklessly disregards the victim’s
consent. 358 The third applies when the actor recklessly disregards that the
victim is mentally or physically incapacitated.359 The fourth situation is
when the victim is less than eighteen, and the actor used his supervisory
authority to accomplish the sexual contact.360 There is a spousal exemption
for simple sexual battery,361 but not for aggravated sexual battery.362
Aggravated sexual battery is a felony in the second degree and
occurs when the actor is armed with a deadly weapon, causes bodily injury
to the victim, is aided by another or the victim is less than sixteen years
old.363 Again, “bodily injury” under the Model Code is defined as “physical
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”364
The Committee also drafted a new statute to add the procedure from
the current Mississippi Statutes on rape and sexual battery.365 The
procedure was taken from the current Mississippi statute, section 97-3-101,
but was conformed to the proposed statutory scheme.366 We are
recommending that the remainder of the statute be eliminated and replaced
by the foregoing.
The Committee did adopt one of the Model Code’s sex crimes
statutes to cover indecent exposure, revising the statute with the needs of
the State in mind.

355. Section 213.3.
356. Section 213.3.
357. Section 213.3(1)(a).
358. Section 213(1)(b).
359. Section 213(1)(c).
360. Section 213(1)(d).
361. Section 213.3(1)(e).
362. Section 213.3(2).
363. Section 213.1(b).
364. Section 213.0(2).
§ 213.0. Definitions
In this Article, the definitions given in § 210.0 apply unless a different meaning plainly is
required.
These definitions are set out in an earlier footnote. See supra note 72.
365. See Appendix B.
366. Section 213.5 Protective orders; Procedure for introducing evidence of
sexual conduct of complaining witness; “complaining witness” defined.
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E. Section 213.5 Indecent Exposure
The Committee adopted the following statute on indecent exposure:
Section 213.5 Indecent Exposure
(1) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure if,
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of
himself or of any other person, he exposes his genitals under
circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to
cause affront or fear alarm.
A first or second conviction of section (1) is a Class B
misdemeanor. A third or subsequent conviction of section
(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure to a
child if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire of himself or of any other person, he exposes his
genitals to a person known to be under sixteen years of age
under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely
to cause affront or alarm.
A first conviction of section (2) is a Class A misdemeanor.
A second or subsequent conviction of section 215.5 is a
Fourth Degree Felony.367
The Model Code’s version of indecent exposure deals with one who
displays his genitals in circumstances known to carry risk of affront or fear
“for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.”368 The Committee
decided to substitute the word “alarm” for “fear.”369 Another offense,
“open lewdness,” addresses the situation in which an actor may lack a
purpose to arouse or gratify sexual desire and yet engage in objectively
lewd display that shocks or outrages observers.370 Open lewdness under
section 251.1 is a Class D misdemeanor and will be discussed in a future
article on crimes against public decency.
Indecent exposure is a type of sexual assault and is a Class B
misdemeanor for a first or second offense, except in the case of a victim
known to be under sixteen. The Committee decided that a subsequent
offense should be a Class A misdemeanor. We also added a subsection that
would punish the first indecent exposure to a child known to be under

367. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).
368. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
369. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).
370. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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sixteen as a Class A misdemeanor. Subsequent such offenses would be
fourth-degree felonies.371
Indecent exposure requires exhibition of the genitals. Display of
buttocks or breast is not covered.372 The Code provision requires that the
actor have a purpose to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of himself or of
another who is not his spouse. We left out the reference to a spouse because
we thought purpose to affront or alarm would be sufficient to criminalize
the exposure regardless of who the person was.373
The requirement of sexual gratification would exclude prankster
exhibitionism. Such conduct may be punished as “open lewdness” under
section 251.1.374 Indecent exposure requires that the actor know that his
conduct is likely to cause alarm. Thus, nudists and exotic dancers would
not be covered.375
Section 215.5 defines indecent exposure more narrowly than prior
statutes. For example one of the Mississippi statutes prohibits “willfully
and lewdly” exposing ones person, or private parts.376 Another statute
prohibits “indecent exposure of his or her person,” as well as abusive
language in or near the dwelling of another.377 Both statutes must be
371. Id.
372. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 410 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
373. Minutes, supra note 26 (January 2020).
374. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 410 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
375. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 407 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
376. MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 97-29-31. Indecent exposure
A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or
private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place
where others are present, or procures another to so expose
himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction for a
first offense, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding
six (6) months, or both. Upon conviction for a second offense
within five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or shall be imprisoned not
exceeding one (1) year, or both. Upon conviction of a third or
subsequent offense within five (5) years, such person shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or shall be
imprisoned for not more than five (5) years in the State
Penitentiary, or both. It is not a violation of this statute for a
woman to breast-feed.
377. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-11.
Disturbance by abusive language or indecent exposure
Any person who enters the dwelling house of another, or the
yard or curtilage thereof, or upon the public highway, or any
other place near such premises, and in the presence or hearing
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intended to cover breast exposure because they both exclude breast
feeding.378 The rationale for limiting the coverage to genitalia in the
proposed statute is to limit the offense to “visual sexual aggression against
the unwilling viewer.”379 This would exclude private conduct that is
conducted without “due regard to privacy.”380 This section is intended to
prohibit intentional sexual exposure for sexual gratification, which is
serious enough for the actor to be treated as a sex offender.381
VI. CONCLUSION
As have other states and the federal government, Mississippi has
recognized the need for criminal justice reform.382 As part of this effort,
the criminal code should be updated and improved. Mississippi has been
justifiably criticized for its criminal laws,383 but this should not be the main
impetus for this effort to revise the penal code. In the interests of justice
and fairness, the conduct prohibited by the criminal law should be clearly
defined with appropriate requirements for mens rea. Also important is that
the punishment should be more carefully related to the seriousness of the
crime. The Committee has attempted to propose new laws that are designed
to serve the goals and the interests of our state.384
The first article, inter alia, explained the proposals for homicide
crimes against the person.385 This article has explained the proposals for
non-homicide crimes against the person. Other than the homicide crimes,
there is no area that requires clarity and definition more than this one, which
includes assault and battery, kidnapping, and sex crimes. The current
versions of these in the Mississippi Code often lack any mens rea
requirement or definition of important terms.386 Adoption of the
Committee’s proposals will supply these crucial elements.
of the family or the possessor or occupant thereof, or of any
member thereof, makes use of abusive, profane, vulgar or
indecent language, or is guilty of any indecent exposure of his
or her person at such place, shall be punished for a
misdemeanor. The act of breast-feeding shall not constitute
indecent exposure.
This statute would also be repealed by Art. 213.
378. Id.
379. MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 213 cmt. at 408 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 410.
382. H.B. 1352 (2019).
383. See supra discussion accompanying notes 3-6.
384. See Johnson, supra note 2, at IV.
385. See Johnson, supra note 2, at V. B.
386. See Appendix C, D and E.
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Appendix A
Domestic Violence Statute Proposed:
Section 211.X Domestic Violence
(1) A person shall be guilty of domestic violence when the offense is
committed against a current or former spouse of the defendant or a child of
that person, a person living as a spouse or who formerly lived as a spouse
with the defendant or a child of that person, a parent, grandparent, child,
grandchild or someone similarly situated to the defendant, a person who has
a current or former dating relationship with the defendant, or a person with
whom the defendant has had a biological or legally adopted child.
(2) A person is guilty of simple domestic violence if he:
(i) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another;
(ii) Criminally negligently causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious
bodily harm; or
(iii) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily harm.
The offense is a Class A misdemeanor, except that it is Felony in
the Fourth degree if at the time of the commission of the offense in
question, he has two (2) prior convictions, whether against the same
or another victim, within seven (7) years, for any combination of
simple domestic violence under this subsection (2) or aggravated
domestic violence as defined in subsection (3) of this section or
substantially similar offenses under the law of another state, of the
United States, or of a federally recognized Native American tribe.
(3) A person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence if he:
(i) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
such an injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life;
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(ii) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to
produce death or serious bodily harm.
The offense is a Felony in the Fourth Degree, except that
(i) the offense is a felony in the third degree if at the time of
the commission of the offense, he has two (2) prior convictions
within the past seven (7) years, whether against the same or
another victim, for any combination of aggravated domestic
violence under this subsection or simple domestic violence,
which is defined as a felony in the fourth degree, as set forth in
Subsection (2) or substantially similar offenses under the laws
of another state, of the United States, or of a federally
recognized Native American tribe.
(ii) the offense is a felony in the second degree if has at least
three (3) previous convictions, whether against the same or
different victims, for any combination of offenses defined in
subsection (3) of this section or substantially similar offenses
under the law of another state, of the United States, or of a
federally recognized Native American tribe.
(4) Reasonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, is not an offense
under this section.
(5) A person convicted under subsection (3) of this section shall not be
eligible for parole under the provisions of Section 47-7-3(1)(c) until he shall
have served one (1) year of his sentence.
(6) For the purposes of this section, “Dating relationship” means a social
relationship as defined in Section 93-21-3.
(7) Every conviction under subsection (3) of this section may require as a
condition of any suspended sentence that the defendant participate in
counseling or treatment to bring about the cessation of domestic abuse. The
defendant may be required to pay all or part of the cost of the counseling or
treatment, in the discretion of the court.
(8) (a) Upon conviction under subsection (3) of this section, the court shall
be empowered to issue a criminal protection order prohibiting the defendant
from any contact with the victim. The court may include in a criminal
protection order any other condition available under Section 93-21-15. The
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duration of a criminal protection order shall be based upon the seriousness
of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the
continued safety of the victim or another person. However, municipal and
justice courts may issue criminal protection orders for a maximum period
of time not to exceed one (1) year. Circuit and county courts may issue a
criminal protection order for any period of time deemed necessary. Upon
issuance of a criminal protection order, the clerk of the issuing court shall
enter the order in the Mississippi Protection Order Registry within twentyfour (24) hours of issuance with no exceptions for weekends or holidays,
pursuant to Section 93-21-25.
(b) A criminal protection order shall not be issued against the defendant if
the victim of the offense, or the victim's lawful representative where the
victim is a minor or incompetent person, objects to its issuance, except in
circumstances where the court, in its discretion, finds that a criminal
protection order is necessary for the safety and well-being of a victim who
is a minor child or incompetent adult.
(c) Criminal protection orders shall be issued on the standardized form
developed by the Office of the Attorney General and a copy provided to
both the victim and the defendant.
(d) It shall be a Class B misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition
of a criminal protection order.
(9) When investigating allegations of a violation of subsection (3) of this
section, whether or not an arrest results, law enforcement officers shall
utilize the form prescribed for such purposes by the Office of the Attorney
General in consultation with the sheriff’s and police chief’s associations.
However, failure of law enforcement to utilize the uniform offense report
shall not be a defense to a crime charged under this section. The uniform
offense report shall not be required if, upon investigation, the offense does
not involve persons in the relationships specified in subsections (1) of this
section.
(10) In any conviction under subsection (3) of this section, the sentencing
order shall include the designation “domestic violence.” The court clerk
shall enter the disposition of the matter into the corresponding uniform
offense report.
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Appendix B
Protective Orders and Procedure Statute Proposed:
Section 213.5 Protective orders; Procedure for introducing evidence of
sexual conduct of complaining witness; “complaining witness” defined
(1) (a) Upon conviction section 213.1-4, the court may issue a criminal
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection
order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of
two (2) years after the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release,
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance, with
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25,
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender.
(b) Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General.
(c) It is a Class B misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a
criminal sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation,
the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other
sentences imposed on the offender. The court shall also be empowered to
extend the criminal sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1)
year for each violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the
violation is not a bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of any other
penalties or disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy.
(2) In any prosecution under Sections 213.1-4, for rape under Section 973-65, former 97-3-67 or 97-3-71, if evidence of sexual conduct of the
complaining witness is offered to attack the credibility of said complaining
witness, the following procedure shall be followed:
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(a) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court
and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the
relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining
witness proposed to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness.
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in
which the offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court
shall order a closed hearing in chambers, out of the presence of the
jury, if any, and at such closed hearing allow the questioning of the
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the
defendant.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual
conduct of the complaining witness is relevant and otherwise
admissible, the court may make an order stating what evidence may
be introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to
be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the
order of the court.
(3) As used in this section and Section 97-3-70 [Repealed], “complaining
witness” means the alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of
which is subject to this section.
(4) In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it
shall not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals,
anus or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to
have sexual intercourse with the attempt to have sexual intercourse with the
child.
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Appendix C
Mississippi Assault Statutes That Would Be Repealed:
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 Simple assault; aggravated assault; simple
domestic violence; simple domestic violence third; aggravated domestic
violence; aggravated domestic violence third
(1) (a) A person is guilty of simple assault if he (i) attempts to cause or
purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (ii)
negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other
means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) attempts by
physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm;
and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than six (6) months, or both.
(b) However, a person convicted of simple assault upon any
of the persons listed in subsection (14) of this section under the
circumstances enumerated in subsection (14) shall be punished
by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($ 1,000.00)
or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
(2) (a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (i) attempts to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life; (ii) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to
produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) causes any injury to a child
who is in the process of boarding or exiting a school bus in the course of a
violation of Section 63-3-615; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or in the
Penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.
(b) However, a person convicted of aggravated assault upon
any of the persons listed in subsection (14) of this section under
the circumstances enumerated in subsection (14) shall be
punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($
5,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30)
years, or both.
(3) (a) When the offense is committed against a current or former spouse
of the defendant or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who
formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant or a child of that person, a
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or someone similarly situated to the
defendant, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with
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the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or
legally adopted child, a person is guilty of simple domestic violence who:
(i) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another;
(ii) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily
harm; or
(iii) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily harm.
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not
more than Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both.
(b) Simple domestic violence: third. A person is guilty of
the felony of simple domestic violence third who commits
simple domestic violence as defined in this subsection (3)
and who, at the time of the commission of the offense in
question, has two (2) prior convictions, whether against
the same or another victim, within seven (7) years, for any
combination of simple domestic violence under this
subsection (3) or aggravated domestic violence as defined
in subsection (4) of this section or substantially similar
offenses under the law of another state, of the United
States, or of a federally recognized Native American tribe.
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment not less than five (5) nor more than
ten (10) years.
(4) (a) When the offense is committed against a current or former spouse
of the defendant or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who
formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant or a child of that person, a
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or someone similarly situated to the
defendant, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with
the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or
legally adopted child, a person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence
who:
(i) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
such an injury purposely,
knowingly or recklessly under
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circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life;
(ii) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to
produce death or serious bodily harm; or
(iii) Strangles, or attempts to strangle another.
Upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment
in the custody of the Department of Corrections for not less than
two (2) nor more than twenty (20) years.
(b) Aggravated domestic violence; third. A person is
guilty of aggravated domestic violence third who, at the
time of the commission of that offense, commits
aggravated domestic violence as defined in this
subsection (4) and who has two (2) prior convictions
within the past seven (7) years, whether against the same
or another victim, for any combination of aggravated
domestic violence under this subsection (4) or simple
domestic violence third as defined in subsection (3) of this
section, or substantially similar offenses under the laws of
another state, of the United States, or of a federally
recognized Native American tribe. Upon conviction for
aggravated domestic violence third, the defendant shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten
(10) nor more than twenty (20) years.
(5) Sentencing for fourth or subsequent domestic violence offense. Any
person who commits an offense defined in subsection (3) or (4) of this
section, and who, at the time of the commission of that offense, has at least
three (3) previous convictions, whether against the same or different
victims, for any combination of offenses defined in subsections (3) and (4)
of this section or substantially similar offenses under the law of another
state, of the United States, or of a federally recognized Native American
tribe, shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than
fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) years.
(6) In sentencing under subsections (3), (4) and (5) of this section, the court
shall consider as an aggravating factor whether the crime was committed in
the physical presence or hearing of a child under sixteen (16) years of age
who was, at the time of the offense, living within either the residence of the
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victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the offense
occurred.
(7) Reasonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, is not an offense
under subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
(8) A person convicted under subsection (4) or (5) of this section shall not
be eligible for parole under the provisions of Section 47-7-3(1)(c) until he
shall have served one (1) year of his sentence.
(9) For the purposes of this section:
(a) “Strangle” means to restrict the flow of oxygen or blood by
intentionally applying pressure on the neck, throat or chest of
another person by any means or to intentionally block the nose or
mouth of another person by any means.
(b) “Dating relationship” means a social relationship as defined in
Section 93-21-3.
(10) Every conviction under subsection (3), (4) or (5) of this section may
require as a condition of any suspended sentence that the defendant
participate in counseling or treatment to bring about the cessation of
domestic abuse. The defendant may be required to pay all or part of the cost
of the counseling or treatment, in the discretion of the court.
(11) (a) Upon conviction under subsection (3), (4) or (5) of this section, the
court shall be empowered to issue a criminal protection order prohibiting
the defendant from any contact with the victim. The court may include in a
criminal protection order any other condition available under Section 9321-15. The duration of a criminal protection order shall be based upon the
seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations,
and the continued safety of the victim or another person. However,
municipal and justice courts may issue criminal protection orders for a
maximum period of time not to exceed one (1) year. Circuit and county
courts may issue a criminal protection order for any period of time deemed
necessary. Upon issuance of a criminal protection order, the clerk of the
issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi Protection Order
Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance with no exceptions for
weekends or holidays, pursuant to Section 93-21-25.
(b) A criminal protection order shall not be issued against the defendant if
the victim of the offense, or the victim's lawful representative where the
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victim is a minor or incompetent person, objects to its issuance, except in
circumstances where the court, in its discretion, finds that a criminal
protection order is necessary for the safety and well-being of a victim who
is a minor child or incompetent adult.
(c) Criminal protection orders shall be issued on the standardized form
developed by the Office of the Attorney General and a copy provided to
both the victim and the defendant.
(d) It shall be a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a
criminal protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the defendant
shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($
500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6)
months, or both.
(12) When investigating allegations of a violation of subsection (3), (4),
(5) or (11) of this section, whether or not an arrest results, law enforcement
officers shall utilize the form prescribed for such purposes by the Office of
the Attorney General in consultation with the sheriff’s and police chief's
associations. However, failure of law enforcement to utilize the uniform
offense report shall not be a defense to a crime charged under this section.
The uniform offense report shall not be required if, upon investigation, the
offense does not involve persons in the relationships specified in
subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
(13) In any conviction under subsection (3), (4), (5) or (11) of this section,
the sentencing order shall include the designation “domestic violence.” The
court clerk shall enter the disposition of the matter into the corresponding
uniform offense report.
(14) Assault upon any of the following listed persons is an aggravating
circumstance for charging under subsections (1)(b) and (2)(b) of this
section:
(a) When acting within the scope of his duty, office or
employment at the time of the assault: a statewide elected
official; law enforcement officer; fireman; emergency medical
personnel; public health personnel; social worker, family
protection specialist or family protection worker employed by
the Department of Human Services or another agency;
Division of Youth Services personnel; any county or municipal
jail officer; superintendent, principal, teacher or other
instructional personnel, school attendance officer or school bus
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driver; any member of the Mississippi National Guard or
United States Armed Forces; a judge of a circuit, chancery,
county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge of the
Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court; district
attorney or legal assistant to a district attorney; county
prosecutor or municipal prosecutor; court reporter employed
by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the
court; public defender; or utility worker;
(b) A legislator while the Legislature is in regular or
extraordinary session or while otherwise acting within the
scope of his duty, office or employment; or
(c) A person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a
person who is a vulnerable person, as defined in Section 4347-5.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-85. Threats and intimidation; by letter or notice
If any person shall post, mail, deliver, or drop a threatening letter or
notice to another, whether such other be named or indicated therein
or not, with intent to terrorize or to intimidate such other, he shall,
upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not
more than six months, or by fine not more than five hundred dollars,
or both.
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Appendix D
Kidnapping Statutes That Would Be Repealed:
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-1. Abduction for purposes of marriage
Every person who shall take any person over the age of fourteen (14) years
unlawfully, against his or her will, and by force, menace, fraud, deceit,
stratagem or duress, compel or induce him or her to marry such person or
to marry any other person, or to be defiled, and shall be thereof duly
convicted, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less
than five (5) years and not more than fifteen (15) years.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53. Kidnapping; punishment
Any person who, without lawful authority and with or without intent to
secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall
inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be
confined or imprisoned against his or her will, or without lawful authority
shall forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any vulnerable person as defined in
Section 43-47-5 or any child under the age of sixteen (16) years against the
will of the parents or guardian or person having the lawful custody of the
child, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its
verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the penalty at imprisonment for
life, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than one (1) year nor more
than thirty (30) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
This section shall not be held to repeal, modify or amend any other criminal
statute of this state.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-83. Threats or coercion to prevent lawful
conduct of business
If any person shall in any manner threaten with bodily harm, intimidate or
coerce another person to prevent said person from lawfully trading or
carrying on business, including buying or selling, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year in the county jail or be fined
not more than one thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00) or both.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-13. False confinement; sending sane person to
psychiatric
hospital
or
institution.
Every person or officer who maliciously sends to or confines in a
psychiatric hospital or institution or other place, any sane person as a person
with mental illness, knowing the person to be sane, shall be guilty of a
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felony, and, on conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five
Hundred dollars.
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Appendix E
Sex crimes statutes that would be repealed:
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65. Statutory rape; enhanced penalty for forcible
sexual intercourse or statutory rape by administering certain substances;
criminal sexual assault protection order
(1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when:
(a) Any person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual
intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of
age;
(ii) Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the
person; and
(iii) Is not the person's spouse; or
(b) A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years;
(ii) Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the
person; and
(iii) Is not the person's spouse.
(2) Neither the victim's consent nor the victim's lack of chastity is a defense
to a charge of statutory rape.
(3) Upon conviction for statutory rape, the defendant shall be sentenced as
follows:
(a) If eighteen (18) years of age or older, but under twenty-one (21)
years of age, and convicted under subsection (1) (a) of this section,
to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years in the State
Penitentiary or a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($
5,000.00), or both;
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(b) If twenty-one (21) years of age or older and convicted under
subsection (1)(a) of this section, to imprisonment of not more than
thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or a fine of not more than
Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00), or both, for the first offense,
and not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each
subsequent offense;
(c) If eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under
subsection (1)(b) of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State
Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may
determine, but not less than twenty (20) years;
(d) If thirteen (13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18)
years of age and convicted under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this
section, such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in
its discretion, may determine.
(4) (a) Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any
person, or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible sexual
intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that person’s consent
by administering to such person any substance or liquid which shall
produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to
prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life
in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases
where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall
fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the
court, in its discretion, may determine.
(b) This subsection (4) shall apply whether the perpetrator is married to the
victim or not.
(5) In all cases where a victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it shall
not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals, anus
or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to have
sexual intercourse with the child.
(6) (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection
order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of
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two (2) years after the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release,
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance, with
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25,
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender.
(b) Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General.
(c) It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a criminal
sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the
defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other
sentences imposed on the offender. The court shall also be empowered to
extend the criminal sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1)
year for each violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the
violation is not a bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of any other
penalties or disciplinary action otherwise allowed by law or policy.
(7) For the purposes of this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean a
joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the
penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female or the penetration
of the sexual organs of a male or female human being in which the penis or
an object is inserted into the genitals, anus or perineum of a male or female.
MISS.

CODE ANN. § 97-3-68. Rape; procedure for introducing evidence of
sexual conduct
of complaining witness; “complaining witness”
defined
(1) In any prosecution for rape under Section 97-3-65, former 97-3-67 or
97-3-71, if evidence of sexual conduct of the complaining witness is offered
to attack the credibility of said complaining witness, the following
procedure shall be followed:
(a) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court
and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the
relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining
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witness proposed to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness.
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in
which the offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court
shall order a closed hearing in chambers, out of the presence of the
jury, if any, and at such closed hearing allow the questioning of the
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the
defendant.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual
conduct of the complaining witness is relevant and otherwise
admissible, the court may make an order stating what evidence may
be introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to
be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the
order of the court.
(2) As used in this section and Section 97-3-70 [Repealed], “complaining
witness” means the alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of
which is subject to this section.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69. Rape; “chaste character” presumed;
uncorroborated testimony of victim insufficient
In the trial of all cases under the last preceding section, it shall be presumed
that the female was previously of chaste character, and the burden shall be
upon the defendant to show that she was not; but no person shall be
convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the injured female.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71. Rape; assault with intent to ravish
Every person who shall be convicted of an assault with intent to forcibly
ravish any female of previous chaste character shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for such shorter time as may be
fixed by the jury, or by the court upon the entry of a plea of guilty.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95. Sexual battery
(1) A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with:
(a) Another person without his or her consent;
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(b) A mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless person;
(c) A child at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of age,
if the person is thirty-six (36) or more months older than the child;
or
(d) A child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age, if the person
is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child.
(2) A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with a child under the age of eighteen (18) years if the person
is in a position of trust or authority over the child including without
limitation the child’s teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist,
psychologist, minister, priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal
guardian, parent, stepparent, aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97. Sexual battery; definitions
For purposes of Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 the following words
shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context otherwise
requires:
(a) “Sexual penetration” includes cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or
pederasty, any penetration of the genital or anal openings of another
person's body by any part of a person’s body, and insertion of any
object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body.
(b) A “mentally defective person” is one who suffers from a mental
disease, defect or condition which renders that person temporarily or
permanently incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his or her
conduct.
(c) A “mentally incapacitated person” is one rendered incapable of
knowing or controlling his or her conduct, or incapable of resisting an
act due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or other
substance administered to that person without his or her consent.
(d) A “physically helpless person” is one who is unconscious or one
who for any other reason is physically incapable of communicating an
unwillingness to engage in an act.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99. Sexual battery; defense of marriage
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A person is not guilty of any offense under Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3103 if the alleged victim is that person’s legal spouse and at the time of the
alleged offense such person and the alleged victim are not separated and
living apart; provided, however, that the legal spouse of the alleged victim
may be found guilty of sexual battery if the legal spouse engaged in forcible
sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged victim.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-101. Sexual battery; penalty; criminal sexual
assault protection order
(1) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section
97-3-95(1)(a), (b) or (2) shall be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a
period of not more than thirty (30) years, and for a second or subsequent
such offense shall be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for not more than forty
(40) years.
(2) (a) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section
97-3-95(1)(c) who is at least eighteen (18) but under twenty-one (21) years
of age shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years in the State
Penitentiary or fined not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($ 5,000.00), or
both;
(b) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section
97-3-95(1)(c) who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older shall be
imprisoned not more than thirty (30) years in the State Penitentiary or fined
not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00), or both, for the first
offense, and not more than forty (40) years in the State Penitentiary for each
subsequent offense.
(3) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery under Section
97-3-95(1)(d) who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall be imprisoned
for life in the State Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the
court may determine, but not less than twenty (20) years.
(4) Every person who shall be convicted of sexual battery who is thirteen
(13) years of age or older but under eighteen (18) years of age shall be
sentenced to such imprisonment, fine or other sentence as the court, in its
discretion, may determine.
(5) (a) Upon conviction under this section, the court may issue a criminal
sexual assault protection order prohibiting the offender from any contact
with the victim, without regard to the relationship between the victim and
offender. The court may include in a criminal sexual assault protection
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order any relief available under Section 93-21-15. The term of a criminal
sexual assault protection order shall be for a time period determined by the
court, but all orders shall, at a minimum, remain in effect for a period of
two (2) years following the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and
subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release,
probation, or parole. Upon issuance of a criminal sexual assault protection
order, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the order in the Mississippi
Protection Order Registry within twenty-four (24) hours of issuance with
no exceptions for weekends or holidays as provided in Section 93-21-25,
and a copy must be provided to both the victim and offender.
(b) Criminal sexual assault protection orders shall be issued on the
standardized form developed by the Office of the Attorney General.
(c) It is a misdemeanor to knowingly violate any condition of a criminal
sexual assault protection order. Upon conviction for a violation, the
defendant shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred
Dollars ($ 500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
six (6) months, or both. Any sentence imposed for the violation of a
criminal sexual assault protection order shall run consecutively to any other
sentences imposed on the offender. The court may extend the criminal
sexual assault protection order for a period of one (1) year for each
violation. The incarceration of a person at the time of the violation is not a
bar to prosecution under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to prohibit the imposition of any other penalties or disciplinary
action otherwise allowed by law or policy.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-103. Sexual battery; relationship with other
criminal statutes
Sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 shall not be held to repeal, modify or
amend any other criminal statute of this state.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23. Fondling child; punishment
(1) Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose
of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious
sexual desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or
her body or any member thereof, or with any object, any child under the
age of sixteen (16) years, with or without the child's consent, or a mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless person as defined
in Section 97-3-97, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined in a sum not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor
more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or be committed to the
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custody of the State Department of Corrections not less than two (2) years
nor more than fifteen (15) years, or be punished by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
(2) Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose
of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious
sexual desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or
her body or any member thereof, any child younger than himself or herself
and under the age of eighteen (18) years who is not such person's spouse,
with or without the child's consent, when the person occupies a position of
trust or authority over the child shall be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or
be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections not less
than two (2) years nor more than fifteen (15) years, or be punished by both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. A person in a
position of trust or authority over a child includes without limitation a
child’s teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, minister,
priest, physical therapist, chiropractor, legal guardian, parent, stepparent,
aunt, uncle, scout leader or coach.
(3) Upon a second conviction for an offense under this section or a
substantially similar offense under the laws of another state, the person so
convicted shall be punished by commitment to the State Department of
Corrections for a term not to exceed twenty (20) years.
MISS. CODE ANN. § § 97-5-41. Carnal knowledge of certain children
(1) Any person who shall have carnal knowledge of his or her unmarried
stepchild or adopted child younger than himself or herself and over fourteen
(14) and under eighteen (18) years of age, upon conviction, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten
(10) years.
(2) Any person who shall have carnal knowledge of an unmarried child
younger than himself or herself and over fourteen (14) and under eighteen
(18) years of age, with whose parent he or she is cohabiting or living
together as husband and wife, upon conviction, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten (10) years.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-31. Indecent exposure
A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts
thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are present, or
procures another to so expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on
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conviction for a first offense, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months,
or both. Upon conviction for a second offense within five (5) years, such
person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or shall be imprisoned
not exceeding one (1) year, or both. Upon conviction of a third or
subsequent offense within five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) or shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years
in the State Penitentiary, or both. It is not a violation of this statute for a
woman to breast-feed.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-11. Disturbance by abusive language or indecent
exposure
Any person who enters the dwelling house of another, or the yard or
curtilage thereof, or upon the public highway, or any other place near such
premises, and in the presence or hearing of the family or the possessor or
occupant thereof, or of any member thereof, makes use of abusive, profane,
vulgar or indecent language, or is guilty of any indecent exposure of his or
her person at such place, shall be punished for a misdemeanor. The act of
breast-feeding shall not constitute indecent exposure.

